


Proximity and Competition: Vaccine diplomacy in the Atlantic space

Eduard Soler i Lecha,
Marixe Ruiz de Austri Arexolaleiba

TRADE/
ECONOMY



This discussion paper was prepared within the framework of the Jean Monnet Atlantic Network 2.0. The European Commission's support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of its content, which reflects the view only of the authors. The Agency and the Commission are not responsible for any use which may be made of the information it contains.

Proximity and Competition: Vaccine diplomacy in the Atlantic space^{*}

**Eduard Soler i Lecha,
Marixe Ruiz de Austri Arexolaleiba^{**}**

^{*} This paper was presented at the “Fourth Jean Monnet Atlantic Dialogue The Atlantic Basin Contributions Towards Multilateralism: An Outlook for the 2020s” Jean Monnet Atlantic Network 2.0 (Brussels, 30-31 May 2022).

^{**} When elaborating and presenting this paper Eduard Soler i Lecha was a senior research fellow at CIDOB and coordinator of its Geopolitics and Security Research Area and Marixe Ruiz de Austri Arexolaleiba worked as a research assistant of CIDOB’s sustainable development area research area.

Abstract

Vaccines have suddenly been incorporated into the foreign policy toolbox of global and regional powers. This article analyses the strategies of producers and recipients of vaccines in the Atlantic Space. It concludes that COVID-19 has reinforced previous trends regarding regional cooperation and global geopolitical competition. In that vein, the Atlantic space has been a laboratory for both cooperation and competition initiatives among vaccine producers and recipient countries. Although material interests have been a major driver in shaping preferences and strategies, this article suggests that symbolic and normative factors also contributed to the configuration of vaccine diplomacies of producers and recipients.

Keywords: Geopolitics, Vaccines, Atlantic, COVID-19

About the authors

Eduard Soler i Lecha is Associate Professor in International Relations, Autonomous University of Barcelona, and Senior Associate Researcher at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB).

Address: Faculty of Political Sciences and Sociology, Despatx B3b/081, Building B2, Avinguda de l'Eix Central, 08193 Cerdanyola del Vallès, Barcelona, Spain
eduard.soler@uab.cat

Marixe Ruiz de Austri Arexolaleiba is researcher at LANIKI, Institute of Co-operative Research of Mondragon University.

Address: Faculty of Humanities and Education Sciences, Mondragon University, Main building, 1.5 Office, Dorleta, 20540 Eskoriatza, Gipuzkoa, Spain
mruizdeaustri@mondragon.edu

CIDOB

BARCELONA
CENTRE FOR
INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS

1 Introduction

C OVID-19 has altered the cooperation and competition dynamics globally. The Atlantic space is no exception. The capacity of a relatively small number of countries to produce vaccines and their willingness to share them with neighbours and partners has become a major leverage in inter-state and inter-regional relations. Recipients of those vaccines are also actively looking for partnerships with those “vaccine powers” and even signing deals to produce them locally.

Despite the growing production capacities, vaccines are a limited good. Therefore, producers are forced to make decisions about the destination of those vaccines as well as whether they will be transferred bilaterally or through multilateral channels. The latter possibly makes more sense if the goal is to increase the effectiveness of the global fight against the pandemic and might also pay off in terms of reputation and influence in multilateral frameworks at a global or regional level. Yet, the former serves to consolidate relations among governments and increase a country’s reputation within the community of recipient countries.

This article examines the strategies of producers and recipients in the Atlantic Space, defined broadly to comprise North, Central and Southern America, Europe and Africa. Have producers – in this case the US, the UK and the European Union – prioritised the countries within this space and particularly those geographically closer to them? In which circumstances has multilateralism been preferred over conventional bilateral agreements? Why have non-Atlantic vaccine powers such as Russia, China and India prioritised certain Atlantic countries in their respective vaccine diplomacies? Has the Atlantic space become a space of competition among Atlantic and non-Atlantic vaccine producers or even among those emerging non-Atlantic global powers? Have recipient countries taken advantage of the global competition to lead the vaccine race?

Prior to analysing the strategies of producers and recipients, this article sets out to assess the process through which health has become part of the diplomatic toolbox of consolidated and emerging powers, and the extent to which a new form of health geopolitics has taken place in the Atlantic space. The article zooms in into the most relevant cases of both producers and recipients, complementing the analysis of general trends and a more granular analysis of the interests and instruments of relevant actors.

Health geopolitics and vaccine diplomacy

The irruption of the pandemic and, especially, the vaccination campaigns, have been feeding the geopolitical debate and dozens of articles were published on the geopolitics of health, vaccine geopolitics and the geopolitics of COVID-19. What is geopolitics? In what way would a geopolitical analysis of this phenomenon differ from other analyses produced by International Relations or Development scholars? Geopolitics considers that geography is a key factor explaining the dynamics of power in the international relations and the behaviour of states and other relevant international actors. Therefore, those analyses attempt to grasp the extent to which geographic factors have shaped health-related decisions in areas such as restricting or permitting mobility, production, purchase, and distribution of vaccines and other medical equipment. The pandemic has been, in any case, a powerful reminder that, contrary to the notion of its death as conceptualised by Richard O'Brian¹, geography is very much alive.

There is no single approach to geopolitics. Classical geopolitics is seen as the realm of those studying states and their capacities to impose themselves over their competitors through their control of the territory, critical routes or highly valuable natural resources. Consequently, a geopolitically driven foreign policy or diplomatic action would be one focusing on competition and trying to take advantage or eventually improve its geostrategic position. However, this is only a certain way of thinking and acting geopolitically. Critical geopolitics has widened the scope of the actors analysed to include non-state actors as well as supranational bodies, and it has also sought to identify the conditions under which geographical elements might favour cooperation over competition and conflict. Critical and innovative approaches to geopolitics go beyond the study of material assets and take into consideration ideational, symbolic and emotional considerations².

Until recently, health was not among the top priority topics for students of international relations. Paradoxically, health was a fertile terrain for international cooperation and one in which functional relations flourished earlier. It is worth recalling the first international sanitary conference, held in Paris, aimed at setting a number of common standards to struggle against the cholera in 1851 or the creation of an international bureau for fighting against epidemics in 1919, a predecessor of

1. O'BRIEN, Richard - *Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography?* London: Pinter/RIIA, 1992.

2. See, among others, TUATHAIL, Gearóid Ó. «Understanding critical geopolitics: Geopolitics and risk society». In *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 22, N° 2-3, 1999, pp. 107-124.

what later on would become the World Health Organisation (WHO), to cope with the needs and learning the lessons from the so-called Spanish flu (1917-1919) which caused the death of around 50 million people (2,5% of the world's population at the time). COVID-19 has propelled health as an emerging area of study when it comes to the study of cooperation and competition, both among great powers and among a wide range of state and non-state actors³.

As COVID-19 erupted, the initial focus of attention was the impact this pandemic might have on China's role as a world power and as a role model, China being the country where the virus was first recorded and one imposing very drastic measures to contain it after the first weeks of contradictory information and secrecy. Gradually, two other topics escalated in the agenda of priorities: the shortcomings of the WHO when dealing with the health crisis – fuelled by the contestation of the global multilateral framework by Donald Trump – and the shortages in facemasks, tests, ventilators and personal protective equipment, which would trigger episodes of cooperation in the form of bilateral donations and the invocation of solidarity mechanisms, but which mainly translated into harsh competition to purchase the scarce units that were on the market as well as forms of protectionism. In those circumstances, a precedent of what is now referred to as the “vaccine diplomacy” emerged. Emerging countries such as China, but also Turkey and Morocco, put forward what was temporarily referred to as a “mask diplomacy” or “medical diplomacy”, in an attempt to strengthen existing relations, promote new ones and overall build a reputation as “problem-solvers”.

The appearance of the first vaccines against COVID-19 was a game-changer and yielded contradictory effects. The vaccine undoubtedly accelerated competition among the limited number of countries that had the means to discover and produce those vaccines. These countries were competing not only for the vaccination of their own population, but also in terms of whose vaccine came first, which one was more effective and how many agencies validated their use. Evoking the notion of an “arms race”, it was common to refer to a “vaccine race”, in which possessing the vaccine was tantamount, all differences aside, to possessing nuclear weapons. In that vein, in this article we refer to vaccine powers in the same way that the scholarship has referred to nuclear powers. In a second stance, those vaccine powers also competed through the use of contracts and donations to consolidate or enlarge their areas of political and economic influence, or even as a bargaining chip when negating other issues.

At the same time, the vaccine favoured very different forms of international cooperation. For instance, several countries, philanthropies, private sector and international organisations joined efforts in the framework of the Global Alliance for the Vaccination and the Immunisation (GAVI), and created a new international platform, COVAX, to facilitate the arrival of vaccines in the countries with fewer resources. Some regions

3. See, among other, BROWN, Gordon; SUSSKIND, Daniel - «International cooperation during the COVID-19 pandemic», *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, Vol 36, N° 1, 2020, pp. S64-s76, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/graa025> & SOLER I LECHA, Eduard (ed.) - *Geopolítica de la salud: vacunas, gobernanza y cooperación*, Barcelona: CIDOB. Available at: https://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/serie_de_publicacion/cidob_report/cidob_report/geopolitica_de_la_salud_vacunas_gobernanza_y_cooperacion

also witnessed a significant boost in cooperative efforts, not only in dealing with the health crisis but also with the economic consequences of it.

Therefore, the analysis of vaccine diplomacy should contemplate both competitive and cooperative strategies. The latter may take place in the scope of bilateral or multilateral frameworks and, very often, in both of them.

The peculiarities of the Atlantic Space

The Atlantic space is a huge area comprising North, Central and Southern America, Europe and Africa. These territories have been linked through a shared and often tragic history, by intense people-to-people cultural connections and dynamic trade and investments flows.

The Atlantic space is an area in which multilateralism through interregional frameworks has been vindicated. For instance, the EU and Latin America have invested in the EU-CELAC summits, but also in other subregional cooperation schemes and, while doing so, they referred to a “community of values”. More recently, the EU and the African Union have also vowed to upgrade and substantiate their bi-regional partnership. In the EU-African summit, in February, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to working together to promote effective multilateralism within the rules-based international order, with the UN at its core. This adds to decades-old partnerships around the Mediterranean, now under the Union for the Mediterranean umbrella.

One of the most interesting developments in the Atlantic Space was the emergence of institutionalised south-south bi-regional frameworks. However, the last South America – Arab States summits (ASPA) took place in 2015, and the Africa-South America summit in 2014. Therefore, whereas different EU-Africa, EU-Mediterranean and EU-Latin American fora have been a space to discuss how to best cope jointly with global challenges – including the most recent health crisis – the south-south connections have lost relevance, at least at a bi-regional level. Coordination and contacts did take place among states in multilateral settings such as the World Trade Organization, but not structured regionally.

Therefore, when it comes to finding a solution to the health crisis, the Atlantic Space is better predisposed than others regarding multilateral, interregional and regional solutions. Did this predisposition translated into effective measures and how did it impact the vaccine diplomacies in the Atlantic space? The following section will shed light on this.

Another peculiarity of the Atlantic space is that, despite not having been the origin of the virus, it encompasses some of the territories that have been more severely affected in terms of contagions and casualties, but also regarding the economic and social effects of the pandemic. According to the estimates in May 2022 collected by Our World in Data, the US and Latin America hold a ratio of 3000 deaths per million people, and the European Union 2440. Some countries present exceptionally high numbers, such

as Peru, with the highest death rate all over the world (6388.18). The exception to this trend in the Atlantic space are the countries of the African continent, with less than 200 deaths per million inhabitants.

The uneven rates in mortalities and infections is partly related to the age structure, with older societies experiencing higher levels of mortality. This is not the only factor, however. High densities and social inequalities in some countries, particularly in Latin America, also contributed to the spread and mortality of the pandemic.

COVID-19 is not only a health crisis but also a socio-economic one. Here the effects were particularly severe in those countries relying on tourism and international mobility, but also those with large segments of the labour force irregularly or infra-employed. There are some extreme cases in the Caribbean, but countries around the Mediterranean and some emerging touristic destinations in West Africa – such as Senegal – also experienced a major economic shock. In fact, the dependence on tourism explains the growth shock in 2020; even more than the development level and the lockdowns' intensity⁴. For other countries the vulnerability stemmed from high levels of indebtedment and subsequent risks of currency and debt crises. This affects not only low-income countries but, first and foremost, middle-income ones.

On the other side of the coin, the Atlantic space has become one of the epicentres in vaccine-related research (mainly in Europe and North America, but South Africa's scientific community has also played a very important role in the study of the virus and its new variants). Interestingly, a small Atlantic state, Cuba, remains the only small country in the global south that has been able to come up with its own vaccine. The countries around the Atlantic have significantly increased their capacities to produce vaccines, building on already existing industrial complexes both in the northern countries but also in some larger Latin American and African countries. Although India remains the "pharmacy of the world", the countries of this region and the Atlantic space as a whole have upgraded their production and export capacities, playing a significant role in the process of immunising the world's population. However, parts of the Atlantic space such as most Sub-Saharan African countries still present very low immunisation rates.

The other peculiarity of the Atlantic space is its role in vaccine production. The EU, the UK and the US are among the top vaccine manufacturers (AstraZeneca, Pfizer, Moderna, Janssen, Novavax). Cuba has also managed to develop two vaccines (Abdala and Soberana) and, in 2022, South Africa also announced the first mRNA vaccine designed, developed and produced at lab scale in the African continent (Afrigen). In May 2022, the EU represented 39.7% of the world's exports, while the US occupies third position with a 15% share⁵. On top of it, some Latin American and African countries

4. UNWTO – *Tourism and covid-19 – unprecedented economic impacts*. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.unwto.org/tourism-and-covid-19-unprecedented-economic-impacts> and UNWTO – *Tourism recovery tracker*. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.unwto.org/tourism-data/unwto-tourism-recovery-tracker>

5. World Trade Organization – *Members welcome Quad document as basis for text-based negotiations on pandemic IP response*, 10-05-2022. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/gc_10may22_e.htm

also reached deals with global producers to manufacture vaccines in their territories. Such is the case of Mexico –AstraZeneca and CanSino–, Venezuela –Abdala–, Brazil –Afrigen, CanSino, Pfizer and Sinovac– and Argentina –Gamaleya and Afrigen, Morocco –Sinopharm–, Algeria –Gamaleya and Sinovac– Tunisia –Afrigen–, Egypt –Sinovac and Afrigen–, Chad –Pfizer and Afrigen–, Nigeria –Afrigen–, Kenya –Moderna–, Rwanda –Pfizer–, Botswana –Biological E– and South Africa –Janssen, Afrigen–⁶.

As the next sections will outline, the Atlantic space has become a domain for geopolitical competition with and among non-Atlantic vaccine producers. The EU's Strategic Compass, a document unanimously adopted by the EU members in March 2022, which sets a shared diagnose on threats and regarding the policies and tools to face them, referred to the role of vaccines in this increasingly competitive world. The document refers to the weaponization of interdependence and soft power, listing vaccines among other assets as instruments of political competition⁷.

To a large extent, COVID-19 has accelerated previously existing trends. China's presence in Africa is evident to any observer, being particularly visible in the extraction and commercialisation of raw materials but also in large investment in infrastructures as well as public debt. European countries and the EU have openly presented this as a challenge and have vowed to strengthen their relations with Africa, including in infrastructures with the Global Gateway project. This quote by the High Representative Josep Borrell shows clearly that Europe perceives it as competition and that health-related factors may have heightened this competitive dimension:

“The pandemic has also moved geopolitical competition in Africa beyond investment and business opportunities to include values and governance models. We find ourselves confronted with other global actors whose methods and agendas are very different from our own. Many of them will not hesitate to use disinformation campaigns and other forms of hybrid warfare to undercut European influence. Despite these difficulties, we still have compelling reasons for wanting to make Europe Africa’s partner of choice”⁸

The opening of a Chinese military base in Djibouti, in 2017, marked a new phase when it comes to China's presence in the continent, and the possibility of China opening a second African base in Equatorial Guinea would add a new layer of complexity in the geopolitical competition in the Atlantic space⁹.

China has also increased its presence in Latin America, a strategy that has been built

6. UNICEF – COVID-19 vaccine market dashboard. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/supply/covid-19-vaccine-market-dashboard>.

7. Council of the European Union - A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to world peace and international security, Brussels, 21.03.2022.

8. HR/VP – «Europe Must Be Africa's Partner of Choice». In Project Syndicate, 14-02-2022. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-africa-partner-of-choice-by-josep-borrell-2022-02>

9. PHILLIPS, Michael M. – «China Seeks First Military Base on Africa's Atlantic Coast, U.S. Intelligence Finds» In Wall Street Journal, 5-12-2021. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-seeks-first-military-base-on-africas-atlantic-coast-u-s-intelligence-finds-11638726327>

on the same pillars: raw materials, investments, and public debt. The main difference is that the security component is still negligible. Yet, Chinese political choices (support to Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua) have been interpreted in light of the global competition with the US.

Russia's capabilities to expand its influence in Africa and Latin America are significantly smaller than those of China, but they are particularly relevant on the security front. Russia supplied 30% of the total weapons purchased by Sub-Saharan African countries in the period 2016-2020, and also stood as the primary supplier to North African states such as Algeria and Egypt¹⁰. The Russian presence in Africa has also grown through the involvement of Russian private military contractors such as the Wagner Group, operating in Mali, Libya and the Central African Republic, among others. On the military front, the countries of East Africa as well as the Sahel seem to feature more prominently in the Russian agenda than the African countries in the Atlantic shoreline. In Latin America, Russia has also opted to openly back those governments that are at odds with the US. The case of Brazil is more complex, as the relationship between Brasilia and Moscow has been mainly built on both countries' BRIC membership, a relationship that has been recently nurtured by the conservative affinity between Vladimir Putin and Jair Bolsonaro.

India, the other non-Atlantic vaccine producer analysed in this paper, has also increased its attention to the African continent. The first India-Africa summit took place in 2008 and, once more, the spotlight has been thrown on the East African countries. In Latin America, the BRICS also provided a platform for the strengthening of relations with Brazil. Yet, Latin America and the Caribbean is still a relatively unexplored priority in Indian foreign policy. Things may change, if for no other reason than because India aims at projecting itself as a global rather than a regional power.

All in all, the next section will illustrate how vaccine diplomacy deployed since 2021 reinforced rather than modified already existing cooperation and competition logics in the Atlantic space. For some Atlantic producers, this added to already existing policies to prioritise relations with the closest neighbours, through both bilateral and regional frameworks. Interregional frameworks have also been used to go beyond the inner circle of neighbours, and this is particularly relevant when referring to an area as wide as the Atlantic space. Among the Atlantic producers we can also observe a mix of cooperative and competitive tactics, a traditional feature in transatlantic relations. For the non-Atlantic producers, this was an unexpected opportunity to consolidate and expand emerging relations with countries from the global south, thus reinforcing the Atlantic space as an area for geopolitical competition.

10. WEZEMAN, Pieter D.; KUIIMOVA, Alexandra; WEZEMAN, Siemon T. – «Trends in international arms transfers, March 2020.» In *SIPRI Fact Sheet*, 03-2021. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/fs_2103_at_2020.pdf

4 Neighbours first: Proximity strategies

For any country it is advantageous that their closest neighbours manage to keep the pandemic in check. This is due to several factors, among which, the fact that they are more exposed to health-related problems in its vicinity due to mobility and tourism; the fact that they tend to have particularly strong commercial relations with their neighbours and COVID19 has represented not only a health crisis but also a socioeconomic shock; the willingness to be perceived by their neighbours as problem-solvers and as preferential partners. And yet, not all the actors have prioritised the neighbourhood approach when making choices on how and where to deploy the vaccine diplomacy. The two which have done so are the EU and the US.

The very existence of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the fact that article 7 of the Treaty of Lisbon states that “the Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness” are the best evidence that the EU has a differentiated approach regarding the countries in its vicinity. More recently, the New Agenda for the Mediterranean adopted on February 2021 aimed at reinforcing ties with the southern neighbours, with the intent to “contribute directly to a long- term vision of prosperity and stability of the region, especially in the social and economic recovery from the COVID-19 crisis”¹¹. Accordingly, by July 2017, the EU had already delivered a support package of over €2.3 billion ¹². Besides, the EU, in collaboration with the European Investment Bank, mobilised over €2.5 billion to support the eastern neighbours in addressing the pandemic and socio-economic recovery ¹³.

Beyond the ENP, the Western Balkans have occupied a privileged place in EU’s response to the pandemic, as the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council “A united front to beat COVID-19” shows ¹⁴. A €70 million package under the Instrument of Pre-Accession was created to help them access EU Member States’ vaccines ¹⁵. However, the presence of Russian

11. European Commission – *Southern Neighbourhood: EU proposes new Agenda for the Mediterranean*, 09-02-2021. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: [C https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_426](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_426).

12. European External Action Service – *European Neighbourhood Policy*, 29-07-2021. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-neighbourhood-policy_en

13. European Commission – *EU support to Eastern Partnership countries in tackling COVID-19*, 12-2021. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/system/files/2021-12/coronavirus_support_eap_1.pdf

14. European Commission – *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council of A United Front To Beat COVID-19*, COM(2021) 35 final. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication-united-front-beat-covid-19_en.pdf

15. European Commission – *Commission adopts €70 million package for early Access to EU COVID-19 vaccines in the Western Balkans*, 28-12-2020. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/ip_20_2539

and Chinese vaccines all over the Western Balkans demonstrates that the EU has not reached the coveted problem-solving role in the region ¹⁶.

The US does not have a “neighbourhood policy”, but the extensive borders with Canada and Mexico, as well as the differentiated treatment of “hemispheric affairs” in the decision-making process, suggest that proximity is also a relevant factor when analysing US foreign policy and international aid choices. However, US’ narrative and practice regarding vaccine and aid sharing evolved during the pandemic. Joe Biden’s global and multilateral approach is, up to a point, a response to Donald Trump’s unilateralist and free-riding discourse. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the Trump administration hosted a high-level meeting with Lopez-Obrador at the White House to secure cooperation on July 2020, whereas it refused to work together with other partners and withdrew from the WHO and therefore from the Pan American Health Organization ¹⁷.

Biden gave fresh impetus to US’ multilateral commitment to project a different kind of leadership. The US reengaged with the multilateral institutions that Trump had abandoned and expressed a cooperative attitude “sharing [...] not to secure favo[u]rs or extract concessions”, but to “save lives and to lead the world in bringing an end to the pandemic”¹⁸. Moreover, being part of the World Health Organization again enabled the US to regain its role in the PAHO, favouring Canada and the southern neighbourhood. The North American Leader Summit was also used as a framework within which to enforce cooperation¹⁹.

16. JUNCOS, Ana E. – «Vaccine Geopolitics and the EU’s Ailing Credibility in the Western Balkans» In *Carnegie Europe*, 08-07-2021. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/07/08/vaccine-geopolitics-and-eu-s-ailing-credibility-in-western-balkans-pub-84900>

17. BOZMOSKI, María Fernanda – «Why AMLO’s meeting with Trump is important.» In *Atlantic Council*, 08-07-2020. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-amlos-meeting-with-trump-is-important/>

18. WHITE HOUSE – *Statement by President Joe Biden on Global Vaccine Distribution*, 03-06-2021. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/03/statement-by-president-joe-biden-on-global-vaccine-distribution/>

19. BRIZUELA DE ÁVILA, María Eugenia; MARTI, Bosco; INSANALLY, Riyad; TREVISAN, Claudia – «US-China vaccine diplomacy: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean». In *Atlantic Council*, 23-02-2022. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/us-china-vaccine-diplomacy-lessons-from-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/>

Regionalism

The EU followed a successful regional approach when delivering vaccines. As data show, by the end of 2021, close to 80% of EU's adult population was fully vaccinated, with little differences between Member States²⁰. As it was committed to the principle of leaving no one behind, it ensured enough vaccines for its members while at the same time contributing extensively to COVAX facilitation. They gave priority to MS but without incurring in "vaccine nationalism"²¹.

In order to reach the goal of vaccinating EUMS' citizens, an agreement was approved on procuring COVID-19 vaccines on behalf of them. This way, EU-level Advance Purchase Agreements with vaccine manufacturers were made possible²². Thus, the EC negotiated with several producers "to build a diversified portfolio of vaccines for EU citizens at fair prices"²³. In fact, by January 2021, the EC had already secured 2.3 billion doses of different vaccines against Covid-19²⁴. Moreover, they made a great effort to negotiate also stepping up vaccine manufacturing capacity in the region, aiming at producing 3.5 billion doses in 2022 in the EU²⁵.

In Africa, regional and international organisations have a long record in managing crises that transcend national borders. This past experience assisted the African Union in developing a "Joint continental strategy for Covid-19 outbreak". Member states appeared committed to pull in the same direction, coordinating efforts and available resources to respond in a regional way to the pandemic. The African Vaccine Delivery Alliance (AVDA) became an essential tool to coordinate doses delivery among Member States of the African Union, alongside with the African Vaccine Acquisition Trust (AVAT), a creation of the African Vaccine Acquisition Task Team (AVATT). The AVAT mechanism "acts as a centralised purchasing agent on behalf of the African Union Member States"

20. European CDC – COVID-19 Situation Updates. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/covid-19>

21. HR/VP – «No to vaccine nationalism, yes to vaccine multilateralism». In *European External Action Service* 13-11-2020. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/no-vaccine-nationalism-yes-vaccine-multilateralism_en

22. European Commission – *Commission decision approving the agreement with Member States on procuring Covid-19 vaccines on behalf of the Member States and related procedures*, C(2020) 4192 final, Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/decision_approving_the_agreement_with_member_states_on_procuring_covid-19_vaccines_on_behalf_of_the_member_states_and_related_procedures.pdf

23. HR/VP – «No to vaccine nationalism, yes to vaccine multilateralism». In *European External Action Service* 13-11-2020. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/no-vaccine-nationalism-yes-vaccine-multilateralism_en

24. European Commission (2021a) *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council of A United Front To Beat COVID-19*, COM(2021) 35 final, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication-united-front-beat-covid-19_en.pdf [accessed 18 May 2022]

25. REUTERS – *EU set to produce over 3.5 billion COVID vaccine doses in 2022 - chief executive*, 28-10-2021. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-set-produce-over-35-billion-covid-vaccine-doses-2022-chief-executive-2021-10-28/>

²⁶, and it has secured more than 50 million doses. The AVDA, on the other hand, was set up to facilitate logistics and correct functioning of vaccine deployment based on a whole-of-Africa approach ²⁷.

The downturn of this activism is that some of the initial expectations were not met. The aim of the African Union was to vaccinate 70% of the population by June 2022; however, only 20% of the adult population was fully vaccinated by then²⁸. In order to ensure access to vaccines, the African Union has established a cooperation with international organisations such as de World Bank ²⁹ the United Nations, the World Health Organisation³⁰and NGOs as OXFAM ³¹.

In Latin America, on the other hand, regional institutions have failed to build a coordinated response to Covid-19 and to make joint vaccine acquisitions .

26. African Union – *Africa Joint Continental Strategy for Covid-19 outbreak*, 2020. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38264-doc-africa_joint_continental_strategy_for_covid-19_outbreak.pdf

27. African Alliance – AVDA Consulted on: 12-06-2022. Available at: <https://africanalliance.org.za/avda/>

28. World Health Organisation Africa – *COVID-19 vaccination in Africa increases by almost three-quarters in June 2022*, 20-07-2022. Consulted on: 12-12-2022. Available at <https://www.afro.who.int/news/covid-19-vaccination-africa-increases-almost-three-quarters-june-2022>

29. WORLD BANK – *World Bank and African Union Team Up to Support Rapid Vaccination for Up to 400 million People in Africa*, 21-06-2021. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/06/21/world-bank-and-african-union-team-up-to-support-rapid-vaccination-for-up-to-400-million-people-in-africa>

30. World Health Organisation Africa – *WHO, partners seek to reboot Africa's health emergency response*, 02-06-2022. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.afro.who.int/news/who-partners-seek-reboot-africas-health-emergency-response>

31. NYADERA, Israel Nyaburi; AGWANDA Billy; ONDER, Murat; Mukhtar, Ibrahim – « Multilateralism, Developmental Regionalism, and the African Development Bank.» In *Politics and Governance*, Vol. 10, N°2, 2022, pp. 82-94. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v10i2.4871>

6 Empowering regional bodies: inter-regionalism in motion

Perceiving itself as a role model of regionalism, the EU is particularly keen on establishing region-to-region frameworks which may include the creation of joint institutions. Very often there is more than one regional organisation per region, particularly when taking into consideration the subregional realities. Therefore, this offers the EU a wide range of options when deciding which partners to choose.

The EU-LAC has been an important inter-regional communication channel for the European Union with the CELAC during the pandemic. These ties rely on bilateral relations between EU Member States and a number of Latin American regional, national and sub-national actors. Among those, we can include the Iberoamerican Summits, which have been essential to bring together Spain and Portugal and Latin American countries. At the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of these summits, Rebeca Grynspan acknowledged Europe as one of the greatest suppliers of COVAX³². Moreover, the Spanish PM committed to donate around 7.5 million doses to the region in the XXVII Iberoamerican Summit of Heads of State and Government³³.

The EU-LAC foundation organised several dialogue sessions on financial initiatives for equitable vaccine distribution against COVID-19 in middle-income Latin American countries, a resilient recovery after pandemic and a study on labour market during and after the pandemic³⁴. Besides, different policy briefs and papers have been published making recommendations to achieve more effective and fruitful cooperation, such as: “COVID-19 Vaccines: The Global Challenge of Equitable Distribution and Access”³⁵ and “Relations between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean in the context of the pandemic: between the past and the future”³⁶. Regional cooperation also takes place with institutions such as The European Humanitarian Aid providing €0.9 million to the Pan American Health Organisation to strengthen local health systems. The EU also supported the Central American Integration System during the negotiations to

32. SEGIB – *Secretaría general iberoamericana pide vacunas para ayudar a América Latina*. 23-07-2021. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.segib.org/secretaria-general-iberoamericana-pide-vacunas-para-ayudar-a-america-latina/>

33. MONCLOA (2021) *España enviará 7,5 millones de vacunas a América Latina a medida que avance la campaña de vacunación nacional*. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/presidente/actividades/Paginas/2021/210421-sanchezcumbre.aspx>

34. European External Action Service – *EU and the fight against covid-19 in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 26-11-2021. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/factsheet-eucovidlac-26nov2021_final.pdf

35. EU-LAC Foundation – *COVID-19 Vaccines: The Global Challenge of Equitable Distribution and Access*. EU-LAC Policy Brief, 2021-04. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: https://eulacfoundation.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/1%20EU-LAC%20Policy%20Brief_EN_0.pdf

36. ÁLVAREZ, María Victoria – «Relations between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean in the context of the pandemic: between the past and the future». In EU-LAC Foundation – *The New Multilateralism in the Age of COVID-19 from the perspective of European Union-Latin America and Caribbean relations*. Hamburg: EU-LAC Foundation, 2021, pp. 3-17.

secure medical supplies³⁷.

As for the Caribbean, the EU has conceded €8 million to the Caribbean Public Health Agency to treatment, vaccines, test reagents etc.³⁸. In addition, €7 million have been delivered to CARICOM in order to implement a programme coordinated also by the PAHO³⁹. The European Investment Bank has partnered with Caribbean Development Bank to deliver €30 million to face health related emergencies⁴⁰.

The European Union also follows a multi bi-regional approach when it comes to Africa. African Union Development Agency-NEPAD will receive €100 million from the EU and Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation throughout the next five years, in order to support the African Medicine Agency (AMA) and other similar initiatives at subregional level. Cooperation between the AMA and the European Medicines Agency is expected to increase in the near future. These funds are part of EU's commitment to improve COVID-19 vaccine access, equity and minimum health standards all over the world ⁴¹.

The European Commission is enforcing its partnership with the World Health Organization, aiming at boosting access to vaccines, medicines and health technologies in Africa, together with boosting local manufacturing. The total contribution consists of €24.5 million and is divided into three categories of action⁴².

In addition, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and the African Centre for Disease Control and Prevention launched a four-year partnership in December 2020, financed by the European Development Fund to scale up preparedness for health emergencies. A meeting took place on November 2021 in which experiences together with successes and lessons learnt were shared ⁴³.

37. European External Action Service – *EU and the fight against covid-19 in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 26-11-2021. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/factsheet-euovidlac-26nov2021_final.pdf

38. LODGE, Junior; REMY, Jan Yves – «The Promise of a Recalibrated Caribbean-European Union Partnership » In *Fundación Carolina- EU-LAC*. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: https://www.fundacioncarolina.es/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Especial_FC_EULAC_3_EN.pdf

39. PAHO – *La UE aporta 7 millones de euros para fortalecer los sistemas de salud resiliencia al clima en el Caribe*, 12-06-2020. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.paho.org/es/noticias/12-6-2020-ue-aporta-7-millones-euros-para-fortalecer-sistemas-salud-resiliencia-al-clima>

40. European External Action Service – *European Neighbourhood Policy*, 29-07-2021. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-neighbourhood-policy_en

41. European Commission – *Ahead of EU-AU Summit, African medicines regulators receive boost of more than 100 million euros from Team Europe and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation*. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/news/ahead-eu-au-summit-african-medicines-regulators-receive-boost-more-100-million-euros-team_en

42. European Commission – *EU support to Eastern Partnership countries in tackling COVID-19*, 12-2021. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/system/files/2021-12/coronavirus_support_eap_1.pdf

43. European CDC – *ECDC4Africa CDC: Sharing experiences, successes and lessons learned among field epidemiology training programmes in Africa and Europe*. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/news-events/ecdc4africa-cdc-sharing-experiences-successes-and-lessons-learned-among-field>

Cooperation and Competition among Atlantic producers

Since Biden's administration replaced Trump's, both the US and the EU have maintained a high profile in common multilateral institutions such as the WHO and the UN. Furthermore, they have created a "US-EU Agenda for Beating the Global Pandemic: Vaccinating the World, Saving Lives Now, and Building Back Better Health Security"⁴⁴. This initiative brings together the two largest Western vaccine producing powers, a transatlantic alliance aimed at the world's vaccination. To that end, COVAX is the key element; and data shows that US has donated 87% -465.71M doses- through this mechanism, the EU 85% -400 M doses-⁴⁵.

However, some clashes have arisen within the World Trade Organization. South Africa and India began a campaign intent on waiving intellectual property protection in vaccines. Countries owning those rights have not welcomed this proposal, except for the US⁴⁶. In what represented a significant departure from previous positions, Biden backed this proposal instead of trying to persuade its transatlantic partners to jointly discuss how to address the production shortage. This was widely seen as another form of vaccine diplomacy, allowing the US to project itself as a more generous partner than the EU and the UK, while aware that the policies would not change due to European resistance and [?] would prevent an agreement at the World Trade Organization. The European Union, and particularly the Commission and some leaders such as Merkel and Macron, reacted by claiming that the EU had been very more generous both in donations and even more so in exports, contributing more decisively than other producers to the world's immunisation.

The European Union and the UK also clashed on 17 March 2021, when Italy blocked a shipment of 0.25 million AstraZeneca doses to Australia. The EU protested that it was a moment when the Union suffered a shortage of vaccines and the Member States were expecting UK's vaccines. The latter invoked a shortfall to justify their delay and to send the abovementioned doses to Australia, which was a bigger quantity than the one sent to Member States⁴⁷.

44. European Commission – *An U.S.-EU Agenda for Beating the Global Pandemic: Vaccinating the World, Saving Lives Now, and Building Back Better Health Security*, 22-09-2021. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_4846

45. UNICEF – *COVID-19 vaccine market dashboard*. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/supply/covid-19-vaccine-market-dashboard>

46. Office of the US Trade Representative – *Statement from Ambassador Katherine Tai on the Covid-19 Trips Waiver*, 05-02-2021. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/may/statement-ambassador-katherine-tai-covid-19-trips-waiver>

47. BBC – *Nicaragua receives China vaccines after cutting ties with Taiwan*, 13-12-2021. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59633388>

Despite this crisis, the EU and the UK have achieved remarkable agreement on other areas such as the mutual recognition of vaccination certification. The NHS COVID Pass was declared equivalent to the EU certificate, facilitating mobility between them as NHS joined EU Digital Covid Certificate⁴⁸. Moreover, even if COVID-19 made it more difficult to maintain regular contact post-Brexit between both parties, a few interparliamentary conferences have been organised virtually, including the COSAC conference which the UK attended as an observer⁴⁹.

Regarding the intellectual property protection waiving, the UK had the same position as the EU, opposing to it. Hence, the UK has been on the same side as the European Commission, while the European Parliament was pressuring it to accept the proposal⁵⁰.

48. European Commission – *EU Digital COVID Certificate*, 07-2021. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/coronavirus-response/safe-covid-19-vaccines-europeans/eu-digital-covid-certificate_en

49. DOWLING, Hannah; HORNE, Alexander – «Westminster and external relations with the European Union». In *UK in a changing Europe: Constitution and Governance in the UK*. London: King's College London, 2022. pp. 19-21.

50. HOWELL, Elizabeth – «Brexit, Covid-19, and Possible Frameworks for Future UK/EU Financial Governance Cooperation. » *The Modern Law Review*, Vol. 84, N° 6, 2021. pp. 1227-1256. DOI: 10.1111/1468-2230.12650

8 The global geopolitical competition

As seen above, the Atlantic space was part of a global competition between traditional Atlantic powers and re-emerged non-Atlantic ones well before the spread of the pandemic. However, COVID 19 has accentuated this competitive or even conflictual dynamics, somehow anticipating the dynamics that became apparent after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Russia was the first country to announce its vaccine, deliberately portrayed as a national success and a sign that “Russia is back”. The chosen name (Sputnik V), reminiscent of the spatial race during the cold war, reinforced the idea that reputation and competition were key ingredients in Russia’s vaccine diplomacy. The relative ease of transporting and storing it allows its use in Africa and Latin America⁵¹, thus contributing to position Russia as a relevant actor beyond its traditional areas of influence.

Russia’s early entry into Latin America enabled the speedy growth of influence in the region before the US joined the competition. It follows a strategy of challenging the US in its own frontiers, a response to the behaviour of this Western power in Russia⁵². Moreover, vaccine diplomacy is used to nurture political relations at the highest level as shown with the invitation to the Russian PM to Mexico⁵³.

As to Africa, Russia had offered the African Union the opportunity to buy 300M doses of Sputnik V, which was rejected due to the high prices. This Eastern power suffered another major throwback as SAPHRA rejected the approval of Sputnik V. It was a shock for Putin as he took for granted the Indian, Chinese and South African markets. In general, “Kremlin’s vaccine diplomacy in Africa is just one tool in a broader campaign to portray Russia as a development, economic, political, and security partner to the continent”⁵⁴. In order to do that Russia exploits historical linkages, for example in Angola, pushing Sputnik V’s approval.

China’s vaccines appear soon after and, following the pattern of the facemask diplomacy, served the goal of changing from being the “source of the problem” into

51. STRONSKI, Paul – «Russian COVID-19 Diplomacy in Africa: A Mixed Bag.» In *Cargie Endowment for International Peace*, 10-12-2022. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/12/10/russian-covid-19-diplomacy-in-africa-mixed-bag-pub-85971>

52. MALACALZA, Bernabé, & FAGABURU, Debora – «¿ Empatía o cálculo? Un análisis crítico de la geopolítica de las vacunas en América Latina.» *Foro Internacional*, Vol. 62, N° 247, 2022. pp. 05-46. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.24201/fo.v62i1.2866>

53. NMAS –«México invita a Putin a fiestas patrias por 200 años de Independencia» In Youtube. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rhdN0wFFhMA>

54. STRONSKI, Paul – «Russian COVID-19 Diplomacy in Africa: A Mixed Bag.» In *Cargie Endowment for International Peace*, 10-12-2022. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/12/10/russian-covid-19-diplomacy-in-africa-mixed-bag-pub-85971>

being the provider of solutions ⁵⁵. China had the unique opportunity to be the binder of non-Western countries, particularly as the West was focused on immunising its own population first.

In this approach, China prioritised those countries with whom it had already established a cooperative relation such as the members of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Latin America and the Caribbean. This includes Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela⁵⁶. Nevertheless, China aimed also at exploring new relations and reached out to some traditional partners of the US such as Colombia –which in return supported China in the Human Rights Committee at the UN⁵⁷- and Mexico, furthermore entering the technological sector –pressuring not to exclude Huawei from 5G concessions in Brazil and the Dominican Republic ^{58 59} -. The defence of the “One China” idea is also an important element of this country’s vaccine diplomacy. In 2018, El Salvador, Panamá and Dominican Republic backtracked on the recognition of Taiwan as they became members of the BRI. In 2021, Nicaragua did the same in exchange for receiving the first 0.2 million doses from the promised 1 million^{60 61}.

China also gives priority to BRI members in Africa. In fact, they launched the African Vaccine Manufacturing Partnership (AVMP) in cooperation with the African Union. China’s foreign policy has focused on promoting cooperation mainly in the fields of health and sustainable development. The latter has been ongoing for years due to the infrastructure built under the BRI and South-South Cooperation Initiative ⁶². The former is clearly patent in the donations of 125 million doses to 47 countries⁶³. Beyond health, military interests also play a role when choosing where to donate vaccines. China intends to build a naval base in Equatorial Guinea. Consequently, it supplied 0.6 million doses to the country, 0.1 of them being donations ^{64 65}.

55. BRIZUELA DE ÁVILA, María Eugenia; MARTI, Bosco; INSANALLY, Riyad; TREVISAN, Claudia – «US-China vaccine diplomacy: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean». In *Atlantic Council*. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/us-china-vaccine-diplomacy-lessons-from-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/>

56. Green Finance and Development Center – *Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)* Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/>

57. El Tiempo – «Colombia aplaude los avances en derechos humanos de China.» In *El Tiempo*, 24-03-2021. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/gobierno/colombia-aplaude-los-avances-en-derechos-humanos-de-china-575906>

58. BALDOCK, Harry – «Huawei gets 5G green light in the Dominican Republic.» In *Total telecom*, 18-02-2021. Consulted on: 05-12-2022. Available at: <https://totaltele.com/huawei-gets-5g-green-light-in-the-dominican-republic/>

59. TOMÁS, Juan Pedro (2022) «TIM Brazil, Huawei ink ‘5G City’ initiative.» In *RCR Wireless*, 07-03-2022. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.rcrwireless.com/20220307/5g/tim-brazil-huawei-ink-5g-city-initiative>.

60. BBC – *Nicaragua receives China vaccines after cutting ties with Taiwan*, 13-12-2021. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59633388>

61. MALACALZA, Bernabé, & FAGABURU, Debora – «¿ Empatía o cálculo? Un análisis crítico de la geopolítica de las vacunas en América Latina.» *Foro Internacional*, Vol. 62, N° 247, 2022. pp. 05-46. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.24201/fi.v62i1.2866>

62. BRIDGE – *China’s progress and growing role in sustainable development*. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://bridgebeijing.com/blogposts/chinas-progress-and-growing-role-in-sustainable-development/>

63. BRIDGE – *China COVID vaccine tracker*. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://bridgebeijing.com/our-publications/our-publications-1/china-covid-19-vaccines-tracker/>

64. Ibidem

65. PHILLIPS, Michael M. – «China Seeks First Military Base on Africa’s Atlantic Coast, U.S. Intelligence Finds.» In *Wall Street Journal*, 05-12-2021. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-seeks-first-military-base-on-africas-atlantic-coast-u-s-intelligence-finds-11638726327>

Moreover, as part of the competition with Western powers, China also entered Eastern Europe and the EU itself, where 5 million Sinopharm vaccines were purchased. Despite the non-approval of the European Medicines Agency, the eastern neighbourhood of the EU has received a large quantity of doses; some of them with caveats – Ukraine was required to stop criticising the Uighurs’ situation in Xinjiang^{66 67}. Russia’s vaccines provided to Hungary seem to have played a similar role as recently shown with Budapest’s stances regarding the war in Ukraine.

Thus, both Russia and China aim at being recognised as major world powers and vaccine diplomacy is a useful tool to reach this foreign policy goal. The Global South was their main target, but they also deployed their vaccine diplomacies in the Global North.

The vaccine diplomacy used by India – the other major non-Atlantic producer – presents some similarities but also a few differences. India is the world’s largest vaccine producer, but its vaccines are not produced by state companies but by private industries with strong international connections. A case in point is AstraZeneca, showing how the colonial reminiscence affects the relation with the UK⁶⁸. India has played an essential role when it comes to vaccine access in low-income countries, before and after COVID19. The Indian government has also been one of the drivers of the proposal presented at the World Trade Organization aiming at waiving intellectual property protection. All this contributes to project India as the protector of the middle- and low-income countries with initiatives as Vaccine Maitri,⁶⁹ and is reminiscent of the role India played in the non-aligned movement and the support to decolonisation processes.

While this position can be seen as one of competition on the normative and reputation front with the Atlantic producers, there has been another layer of the vaccine diplomacy in which China has been the great contender. India is trying to compete with China as a major Asian and World economy, and this is reflected in areas such as infrastructures, with India developing its own corridors and boycotting the BRI Summit in 2019⁷⁰. India’s health diplomacy in Africa preceded COVID-19, supplying drugs to fight HIV/AIDS and Malaria along with other programmes under SDGs, 2030 Agenda and “Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want”⁷¹. The rivalry with China can be seen in East Africa, in countries in the Indian Ocean region, where they project their regional dispute as well. Although not central in this competition, it is worth noting that India’s donations in the Atlantic space have prioritised those countries that recognize Taiwan -St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia,

66. ASPINALL, Evie – «The Rise of Vaccine diplomacy.» In *British Foreign Policy Group*, 23-07-2022. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://bfp.g.co.uk/2021/07/the-rise-of-vaccine-diplomacy/>

67. BRIDGE – *China COVID vaccine tracker*. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://bridgebeijing.com/our-publications/our-publications-1/china-covid-19-vaccines-tracker/>

68. MALACALZA, Bernabé, & FAGABURU, Debora – «¿ Empatía o cálculo? Un análisis crítico de la geopolítica de las vacunas en América Latina.» *Foro Internacional*, Vol. 62, N° 247, 2022. pp. 05-46. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.24201/fo.v62i1.2866>

69. BERI, Ruchita – «India’s Vaccine Maitri with Africa.» In *Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*, 11-03.2021. Consulted on: 07-12-2022- Available at: <https://idsa.in/idsacomments/indias-vaccine-maitri-with-africa-rberi-110321>

70. KAMDAR, Bansari – «What to Make of India’s Absence from the Second Belt and Road Forum? »In *The Diplomat*, 09-05-2021. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/what-to-make-of-indias-absence-from-the-second-belt-and-road-forum/>

71. BERI, Ruchita – «India’s Vaccine Maitri with Africa.» In *Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*, 11-03.2021. Consulted on: 07-12-2022- Available at: <https://idsa.in/idsacomments/indias-vaccine-maitri-with-africa-rberi-110321>

St Vincent & Grenadines and Belize in the Caribbean, Guatemala and Paraguay in Latin America⁷².

Recipient countries are not passive actors in this global geopolitical race. Instead, they take advantage of the competition among the great powers, prioritising self-interests when making decisions about donation receptions or manufacture allocations.

The case of Mexico clearly illustrates the above. In the absence of major US or European support, the Mexican government purchases Chinese PPE material and the establishment of the air-bridge⁷³, which prepared the ground for subsequent agreements on vaccine purchases and production with both China and Russia. This may have improved Mexico's negotiating position with the US, as Washington likely feared Mexico becoming too dependent on the US' global rivals⁷⁴. Similarly, Argentina took advantage of the opportunity to strengthen ties with China and Russia, in an attempt to keep IMF and the US satisfied at the same time. In fact, the donations of Sputnik V vaccines may have had a measure of influence in the initial non-condemnation of Russia's intervention in Ukraine.

Trinidad and Tobago is a fascinating case too, as both China and India have provided significant amounts of vaccines to this Caribbean country, the former delivering 1.1 million doses whereas the latter supplied the country with 40,000 vaccines⁷⁵. Before COVID-19, it showed China's ability to profit from its lending capacities, particularly among countries that aimed at avoiding structural readjustment requirements imposed by the IMF⁷⁶. As for India, the choice of Trinidad, but also smaller but crucial donations to other Caribbean states such as St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent & Grenadines and St Lucia, indicates that India wants to project itself as a global and not merely as an Asian or Indo-Pacific country, and that while doing so it can take advantage of old people-to-people connections such as the strong links with Trinidad and Tobago through migration during the times of the British colonial rule⁷⁷.

Among African countries, Morocco and South Africa are telling examples of proactive foreign policy. Morocco carried out a facemask diplomacy delivering facemasks and hydroalcoholic gels to fifteen African countries during the summer of 2020⁷⁸. The

72. UNICEF – COVID-19 vaccine market dashboard. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/supply/covid-19-vaccine-market-dashboard>

73. El Universal (2020) «Mexico receives medical supplies from China to fight the COVID-19 pandemic.» In *El Universal*, 03-06-2020. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/english/mexico-receives-medical-supplies-china-fight-covid-19-pandemic>

74. UNICEF – COVID-19 vaccine market dashboard. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/supply/covid-19-vaccine-market-dashboard> and BRIDGE – China COVID vaccine tracker. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://bridgebeijing.com/our-publications/our-publications-1/china-covid-19-vaccines-tracker/>

75. Ibidem

76. BRIZUELA DE ÁVILA, María Eugenia; MARTI, Bosco; INSANALLY, Riyad; TREVISAN, Claudia – «US-China vaccine diplomacy: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean». In *Atlantic Council*. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/us-china-vaccine-diplomacy-lessons-from-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/>

77. CASWELL, Viranjini – «The Indian Community in Trinidad: An Interview with Viranjini Munasinghe.» In *Asia Society*, 2020. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://asiasociety.org/indian-community-trinidad-interview-viranjini-munasinghe>

78. Africanews – Morocco sends 8 million masks to 15 African countries, 15-06-2020. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.africanews.com/2020/06/15/morocco-sends-8-million-masks-to-15-african-countries/>.

European Union's approach, as a part of the southern neighbourhood, made possible the recognition of the Moroccan vaccine certification inside the EU, facilitating mobility between them⁷⁹. Simultaneously, Morocco also strengthened its ties with China, which led to Sinopharm vaccine production and the signing of the BRI implementation, Morocco becoming the first North African country to do so. The case of South Africa is a complex one. Despite being part of the BRICS, the South African Medical Agency rejected the approval of Sputnik V. Instead, South Africa has coordinated many initiatives, including within the WTO, with India, and in February 2022 the South African regulator approves Sinopharm COVID vaccine. Smaller countries may also attempt to profit from this geopolitical competition. The cases of Equatorial Guinea and Djibouti are quite telling. Growing security interests translated into significant vaccine deliveries there⁸⁰.

Angola's case is also interesting due to the variety of vaccine providers in the country. China was the first supplying them with vaccines, and it has delivered 7.28 million doses of Sinopharm and Sinovac in total^{81 82}. This may have been intended to improve Beijing's relations with Joao Lourenço, the new president who has voiced his concern regarding Angola's dependence on China, because of the loans they have received for development and oil infrastructure improving⁸³. Moreover, China is the first destination of Angola's exports, Beijing importing \$14.3 billion of crude oil per year. Russia's interests in the region concern mineral extraction, as it can be seen with the donation of 25.000 Sputnik V and Light doses to the Government by Alrosa, a Russian partially state-owned diamond mining firm^{84 85}. The colonial past is the key aspect that stands out when we look at donations, as Portugal is the second bigger donor with almost 2 million doses, which constitutes the 25% of the total Portuguese donations. Moreover, common frameworks as the Community of Portuguese speaking Countries provide an opportunity to strengthen ties between both parties.

79. WILSON, James – «EU recognizes Moroccan Vaccination Certificate.» In *EU Political Report*, 16-09-2022. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.eupoliticalreport.eu/eu-recognises-moroccan-vaccine-certificate/>

80. BRIDGE – *China COVID vaccine tracker*. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: <https://bridgebeijing.com/our-publications/our-publications-1/china-covid-19-vaccines-tracker/>

81. Ibidem

82. Xinhua – *Angola receives COVID-19 vaccines donated by China*, 27-03-2021. Consulted on: 06-12-2022. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-03/27/c_139839032.htm

83. DE CARVALHO, Paul; KOPINSKI, Dominik; TAYLOR, Ian – «A Marriage of Convenience on the Rocks? Revisiting the Sino-Angolan Relationship.» In *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 51, N° 1, 2022, pp. 5-29

84. Diamond World – *ALROSA together with Russia's embassy donated 'Sputnik V' vaccines to Angola*, 02-06-2021. Consulted on: 07-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.diamondworld.net/contentview.aspx?item=25620>

85. Ver Angola – *Russian mining giant Alrosa says is in Angola to stay*, 11-20-2021. Consulted on: 08-12-2022. Available at: <https://www.verangola.net/va/en/112021/RawMaterials/28330/Russian-mining-giant-Alrosa-says-is-in-Angola-to-stay.htm>



Conclusion

The study of vaccine diplomacies in the Atlantic space translates into five main conclusions : (1) COVID-19 has reinforced previous trends, both in the realm of multilateral cooperation (e.g. inter-regionalism) but also when it comes to competition among major global powers; (2) Although rarely framed as such, the Atlantic space is central as a major vaccine producer, contributing to world immunisation (3) The Atlantic space has been a laboratory for both cooperation and competition initiatives among vaccine producers; (4) recipient countries take advantage both of cooperative frameworks and of the increased competition among major producers to have access to the much-needed vaccines; (5) although material interests are a major driver in shaping preferences and strategies, symbolic and normative factors contribute to the configuration of vaccine diplomacies of producers and recipients.

Further efforts of collective research in the Atlantic space and beyond will shed light on the specificities of health and vaccines as an area for cooperation and competition, and the extent to which COVID-19 only reinforced and accelerated previously existing trends and has significantly altered the preferences for cooperation and competition in the Atlantic space. The looming environmental crisis and the global repercussions of the war in Ukraine in areas such as food security stand out as a fertile ground for comparative studies that could allow us to identify, compare and assess the drivers and inhibitors of international, regional, and interregional cooperation.

Bibliography

Africa CDC – «European Union and African Union sign partnership to scale up preparedness for health emergencies.» In *African Union*, 07-12-2020. Consultado em: 22-05-2022. Disponível em: <https://africacdc.org/news-item/european-union-and-african-union-sign-partnership-to-scale-up-preparedness-for-health-emergencies/>

African Alliance – AVDA Consultado em: 12-06-2022. Disponível em: <https://africanalliance.org.za/avda/>

African Alliance – *Partners* Consultado em: 12-06-2022. Disponível em: <https://africanalliance.org.za/partners/>

African Union – *Africa Joint Continental Strategy for Covid-19 outbreak*, 2020. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponível em: https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38264-doc-africa_joint_continental_strategy_for_covid-19_outbreak.pdf

African Union – «*African Vaccine Acquisition Trust delivers 12000 doses of COVID-19 vaccine to the African Union.*» In *African Union*, 03-09-2021. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://africacdc.org/news-item/african-vaccine-acquisition-trust-delivers-12-000-doses-of-covid-19-vaccine-to-the-african-union/>

Africanews – *Morocco sends 8 million masks to 15 African countries*, 15-06-2020. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://www.africanews.com/2020/06/15/morocco-sends-8-million-masks-to-15-african-countries/>.

ALVAREZ, María Victoria – «Relations between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean in the context of the pandemic: between the past and the future». In EU-LAC Foundation – *The New Multilateralism in the Age of COVID-19 from the perspective of European Union-Latin America and Caribbean relations*. Hamburg: EU-LAC Foundation, 2021, pp. 3-17.

ASPINALL, Evie – «The Rise of Vaccine diplomacy.» In *British Foreign Policy Group*, 23-07-2022. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://bfp.org.uk/2021/07/the-rise-of-vaccine-diplomacy/>

BALDOCK, Harry – «Huawei gets 5G green light in the Dominican Republic.» In *Total telecom*, 18-02-2021. Consultado em: 05-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://totaltele.com/huawei-gets-5g-green-light-in-the-dominican-republic/>

BBC – *Nicaragua receives China vaccines after cutting ties with Taiwan*, 13-12-2021. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59633388>

BERI, Ruchita – «India's Vaccine Maitri with Africa.» *In Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*, 11-03.2021. Consultado em: 07-12-2022- Disponível em: <https://idsa.in/idsacomments/indias-vaccine-maitri-with-africa-rberi-110321>

BOZMOSKI, María Fernanda – «Why AMLO's meeting with Trump is important.» *In Atlantic Council*, 08-07-2020. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-amlos-meeting-with-trump-is-important/>

BRIDGE – *China's progress and growing role in sustainable development*. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://bridgebeijing.com/blogposts/chinas-progress-and-growing-role-in-sustainable-development/>

BRIDGE – *China COVID vaccine tracker*. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://bridgebeijing.com/our-publications/our-publications-1/china-covid-19-vaccines-tracker/>

BRIZUELA DE ÁVILA, María Eugenia; MARTI, Bosco; INSANALLY, Riyad; TREVISAN, Claudia – «US-China vaccine diplomacy: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbea.» *In Atlantic Council*. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/us-china-vaccine-diplomacy-lessons-from-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/>

BROWN, Gordon; SUSSKIND, Daniel - «International cooperation during the COVID-19 pandemic», *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, Vol 36, N°_1, 2020, pp. S64-s76, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/graa025>

CASWELL, Viranjini – «The Indian Community in Trinidad: An Interview with Viranjini Munasinghe.» *In Asia Society*, 2020 . Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://asiasociety.org/indian-community-trinidad-interview-viranjini-munasinghe>

Council of the European Union - *A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to world peace and international security*, Brussels, 21.03.2022.

DIPLO – «China's vaccine diplomacy in Africa.» *In Diplomacy*, 12-2021. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://www.diplomacy.edu/updates/chinas-vaccine-diplomacy-in-africa/>

DOWLING, Hannah; HORNE, Alexander – «Westminster and external relations with the European Union». *In UK in a changing Europe: Constitution and Governance in the UK*. London: King's College London, 2022. pp. 19-21.

El Tiempo – «Colombia aplaude los avances en derechos humanos de China.» *In El Tiempo*, 24-03-2021. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponible em: <https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/gobierno/colombia-aplaude-los-avances-en-derechos-humanos-de-china-575906>

El Universal (2020) «Mexico receives medical supplies from China to fight the COVID-19 pandemic.» *In El Universal*, 03-06-2020. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponible em: <https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/english/mexico-receives-medical-supplies-china-fight-covid-19-pandemic>

EU-LAC Foundation – *COVID-19 Vaccines: The Global Challenge of Equitable Distribution and Access. EU-LAC Policy Brief*, 2021-04. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponible em: https://eulacfoundation.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/1%20EU-LAC%20Policy%20Brief_EN_0.pdf

European CDC – *ECDC4Africa CDC: Sharing experiences, successes and lessons learned among field epidemiology training programmes in Africa and Europe*. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponible em: <https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/news-events/ecdc4africa-cdc-sharing-experiences-successes-and-lessons-learned-among-field>

European CDC – *COVID-19 Situation Updates*. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponible em: <https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/covid-19>

European Commission – *Commission adopts €70 million package for early Access to EU COVID-19 vaccines in the Western Balkans*, 28-12-2020. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponible em: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/ip_20_2539

European Commission – *Commission decision approving the agreement with Member States on procuring Covid-19 vaccines on behalf of the Member States and related procedures*, C(2020) 4192 final, Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponible em: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/decision_approving_the_agreement_with_member_states_on_procuring_covid-19_vaccines_on_behalf_of_the_member_states_and_related_procedures.pdf

European Commission – *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council of A United Front To Beat COVID-19*, COM(2021) 35 final. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponible em: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication-united-front-beat-covid-19_en.pdf

European Commission – *An U.S.-EU Agenda for Beating the Global Pandemic: Vaccinating the World, Saving Lives Now, and Building Back Better Health Security*, 22-09-2021. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponible em: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_4846

European Commission – *EU support to Eastern Partnership countries in tackling COVID-19*, 12-2021. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponible em: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/system/files/2021-12/coronavirus_support_eap_1.pdf

European Commission – *EU-Latin America & Caribbean Leaders’ Meeting: Joining Forces for a Sustainable post-COVID Recovery* - Press release by President Michel and President von der Leyen, 02-12-2021. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponível em: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6541

European Commission – *Southern Neighbourhood: EU proposes new Agenda for the Mediterranean*, 09-02-2021. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_426.

European Commission – *Ahead of EU–AU Summit, African medicines regulators receive boost of more than 100 million euros from Team Europe and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation*. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponível em: https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/news/ahead-eu-au-summit-african-medicines-regulators-receive-boost-more-100-million-euros-team_en

European Commission – *EU Digital COVID Certificate*, 07-2021. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponível em: https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/coronavirus-response/safe-covid-19-vaccines-europeans/eu-digital-covid-certificate_en

European Commission – *EU strengthens partnership with WHO to boost local manufacturing and access to vaccines, medicines and health technologies in Africa*, 24-03-2022. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponível em: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1970

European External Action Service – *European Neighbourhood Policy*, 29-07-2021. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponível em: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-neighbourhood-policy_en

European External Action Service – *EU and the fight against covid-19 in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 26-11-2021. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponível em: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/factsheet-eucovidlac-26nov2021_final.pdf

Green Finance and Development Center – *Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)* Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/>

HERSZENHORN, David M.; MOMTAZ, Rym.; VON DER BURCHARD, Hans – «EU pushes back on Biden plan to waive coronavirus vaccine patents.» *In Politico*, 08-05-2021. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-pushes-back-on-biden-plan-to-waive-patents-as-contest-escalates-in-global-vaccine-diplomacy/>

House of Commons Library – *Coronavirus: UK support to the Overseas Territories*, 01-06-2021. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9021/>

HOWELL, Elizabeth – «Brexit, Covid-19, and Possible Frameworks for Future UK/EU Financial Governance Cooperation. » *The Modern Law Review*, Vol. 84, N° 6, 2021. pp. 1227-1256. DOI: 10.1111/1468-2230.12650.

HR/VP – «No to vaccine nationalism, yes to vaccine multilateralism». In *European External Action Service* 13-11-2020. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponible em: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/no-vaccine-nationalism-yes-vaccine-multilateralism_en

HR/VP – «Europe Must Be Africa's Partner of Choice». In *Project Syndicate*, 14-02-2022. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponible em: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-africa-partner-of-choice-by-josep-borrell-2022-02>

KAMDAR, Bansari – « What to Make of India's Absence from the Second Belt and Road Forum? » In *The Diplomat*, 09-05-2021. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponible em: <https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/what-to-make-of-indias-absence-from-the-second-belt-and-road-forum/>

LODGE, Junior; REMY, Jan Yves – «The Promise of a Recalibrated Caribbean-European Union Partnership » In *Fundación Carolina- EU-LAC*. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponible em: https://www.fundacioncarolina.es/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Especial_FC_EULAC_3_EN.pdf

MALACALZA, Bernabé, & FAGABURU, Debora – «¿ Empatía o cálculo? Un análisis crítico de la geopolítica de las vacunas en América Latina.» *Foro Internacional*, Vol. 62, N° 247, 2022. pp. 05-46. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.24201/fi.v62i1.2866>

MONCLOA (2021) *España enviará 7,5 millones de vacunas a América Latina a medida que avance la campaña de vacunación nacional*. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponible em: <https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/presidente/actividades/Paginas/2021/210421-sanchezcumbre.aspx>

NMAS – «México invita a Putin a fiestas patrias por 200 años de Independencia» In Youtube. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponible em: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rhdN0wFFhmA>

NYADERA, Israel Nyaburi; AGWANDA Billy; ONDER, Murat; Mukhtar, Ibrahim – « Multilateralism, Developmental Regionalism, and the African Development Bank.» In *Politics and Governance*, Vol. 10, N°2, 2022, pp. 82-94. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v10i2.4871>

Office of the US Trade Representative – *Statement from Ambassador Katherine Tait on the Covid-19 Trips Waiver*, 05-02-2021. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponible em: <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/may/statement-ambassador-katherine-tai-covid-19-trips-waiver>

O'BRIEN, Richard – *Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography?* London: Pinter/RIIA

PAHO – *La UE aporta 7 millones de euros para fortalecer los sistemas de salud resiliencia al clima en el Caribe*, 12-06-2020. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponible em: <https://www.paho.org/es/noticias/12-6-2020-ue-aporta-7-millones-euros-para-fortalecer-sistemas-salud-resiliencia-al-clima>

PHILLIPS, Michael M. – «China Seeks First Military Base on Africa’s Atlantic Coast, U.S. Intelligence Finds.» In *Wall Street Journal*, 05-12-2021. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponible em: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-seeks-first-military-base-on-africas-atlantic-coast-u-s-intelligence-finds-11638726327>

REUTERS – «Covid: Italy blocks AstraZeneca vaccine shipment to Australia.» In *BBC*, 05-03-2021. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponible em: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56279202>

REUTERS – *EU set to produce over 3.5 billion COVID vaccine doses in 2022 - chief executive*, 28-10-2021. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponible em: <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-set-produce-over-35-billion-covid-vaccine-doses-2022-chief-executive-2021-10-28/>>

Reuters – «Irán, primer país que producirá vacuna cubana Soberana 02 contra Covid-19.» In *Forbes*, 28-07-2021. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponible em: <https://www.forbes.com.mx/iran-primer-pais-que-producira-vacuna-cubana-soberana-02-contra-covid-19/>

SEGIB – *Secretaria general iberoamericana pide vacunas para ayudar a América Latina*. 23-07-2021. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponible em: <https://www.segib.org/secretaria-general-iberoamericana-pide-vacunas-para-ayudar-a-america-latina/>

SOLER I LECHA, Eduard (ed.) - *Geopolítica de la salud: vacunas, gobernanza y cooperación*, Barcelona: CIDOB. Disponible em: https://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/serie_de_publicacion/cidob_report/cidob_report/geopolitica_de_la_salud_vacunas_gobernanza_y_cooperacion

STRONSKI, Paul – «Russian COVID-19 Diplomacy in Africa: A Mixed Bag.» In *Cargie Endowment for International Peace*, 10-12-2022. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponible em: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/12/10/russian-covid-19-diplomacy-in-africa-mixed-bag-pub-85971>

TOMÁS, Juan Pedro (2022) «TIM Brazil, Huawei ink ‘5G City’ initiative.» In *RCR Wireless*, 07-03-2022. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponible em: <https://www.rcrwireless.com/20220307/5g/tim-brazil-huawei-ink-5g-city-initiative>.

TUATHAIL, Gearóid Ó. «Understanding critical geopolitics: Geopolitics and risk society.» In *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 22, N° 2-3, 1999, pp. 107-124.

UNICEF – *COVID-19 vaccine market dashboard*. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponible em: <https://www.unicef.org/supply/covid-19-vaccine-market-dashboard>

UNWTO – Tourism and covid-19 – unprecedented economic impacts. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://www.unwto.org/tourism-and-covid-19-unprecedented-economic-impacts>.

UNWTO – *Tourism recovery tracker*. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://www.unwto.org/tourism-data/unwto-tourism-recovery-tracker>

WEZEMAN, Pieter D.; KUIMOVA, Alexandra; WEZEMAN, Siemon T. – «Trends in international arms transfers, March 2020.» In *SIPRI Fact Sheet*, 03-2021. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponível em: https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/fs_2103_at_2020.pdf

White House – *Statement by President Joe Biden on Global Vaccine Distribution*, 03-06-2021. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/03/statement-by-president-joe-biden-on-global-vaccine-distribution/>

WILSON, James – «EU recognizes Moroccan Vaccination Certificate. » In *EU Political Report*, 16-09-2022. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://www.eupoliticalreport.eu/eu-recognises-moroccan-vaccine-certificate/>

WORLD BANK – *World Bank and African Union Team Up to Support Rapid Vaccination for Up to 400 million People in Africa*, 21-06-2021. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/06/21/world-bank-and-african-union-team-up-to-support-rapid-vaccination-for-up-to-400-million-people-in-africa>

World Health Organisation Africa – *COVID-19 vaccination in Africa increases by almost three-quarters in June 2022*, 20-07-2022. Consultado em: 12-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://www.afro.who.int/news/covid-19-vaccination-africa-increases-almost-three-quarters-june-2022>

World Health Organisation Africa – *WHO, partners seek to reboot Africa's health emergency response*, 02-06-2022. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponível em: <https://www.afro.who.int/news/who-partners-seek-reboot-africas-health-emergency-response>

World Trade Organization – *Members welcome Quad document as basis for text-based negotiations on pandemic IP response*, 10-05-2022. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponível em: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/gc_10may22_e.htm

World Trade Organization – *WTO-IMF COVID-19 Vaccine Trade Tracker*. Consultado em: 07-12-2022. Disponível em: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/vaccine_trade_tracker_e.htm

XINHUA – *Angola receives COVID-19 vaccines donated by China*, 27-03-2021. Consultado em: 06-12-2022. Disponível em: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-03/27/c_139839032.htm>

About the Project

The Jean Monnet Atlantic Network 2.0 is a small network of six members that keep intense communication and joint activities on the Atlantic Basin. The Network also serves as a central arena for discussing globalisation and key major trends in the several Atlantic microcosms. By combining the national with the regional perspective, its research and debates take into account the different foreign interests and pressures, as well as a critical view on the possible roles and future of the European Union (EU) in the area.

It is the present link of a long chain of projects. In 2016, the project that established the first Jean Monnet Network on Atlantic Studies (jeanmonnetnetwork.com.br) sought to foster knowledge and co-operation among scholars and researchers on topics of fundamental importance for Atlantic actors in general, and for the EU, in particular. It involved a greater number of centres and universities.

Seven years later, still focussed on the original three broad thematic axes -Energy/Sustainability, Trade/Economy (International Economic Flows) and Security/Inequality-, the Jean Monnet Atlantic Network 2.0 represents a continuation and a rupture with the previous undertakings.

It intends to offer a wide, innovative and sometimes controversial view on Atlantic problems and the expectations on and scope of the EU activities relative to them. The papers in this series are a sample of its achievements.





With the support of the
Erasmus+ Programme
of the European Union

www.jmatlanticnetwork2.com