



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Ninfa M. Fuentes-Sosa,
Luis A. Barrueta Ocampo

TRADE/
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Challenges and opportunities from deep trade integration between EU-LA after the COVID-19 pandemic

Ninfa M. Fuentes-Sosa*,
Luis A. Barrueta Ocampo**

* The Director and Research Professor of the International Studies Division at CIDE. She holds a Master's degree in Administration and Public Policy and a PhD in Government, focusing on International Political Economy, from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Before joining CIDE, she was the Director of the Department of International Studies at the Universidad Iberoamericana (UIA) in Mexico City. She is also a beneficiary of the Repatriation and Settlement Program for Foreign Researchers, sponsored by the Mexican National Council of Science and Technology (CONACYT). Over her career, she has held various elected positions, such as serving on the Executive Committee of the Political Studies Association (PSA) in the United Kingdom, the Editorial Board of Mexico's Reforma Newspaper, and the European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR). Her most recent publication is the book *Deep Integration and Latin American Trade Agreements* (Routledge, 2022).

** Business Consultant. He holds a Master of Business Administration (MBA) degree from the London Business School (LBS). He has worked with various multinational strategic consulting firms, implementing projects in multiple countries throughout Europe and America.

Abstract

The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic has had repercussions on regional integration in the EU and Latin America and the relationship between them both. The agreements established by the EU and countries and other regional spaces in Latin America have the potential to contribute to the challenges placed by the economic and sanitary crisis. Further coordination could enhance the economic opportunities of the regions. This paper analyses the status of deep integration in the agreements established between both regions by assessing their operative, coverage and institutional dimensions. Second, the paper schematically assesses the strengths and areas of opportunity to deepen integration across its dimensions. Third, the paper also explores the challenges and opportunities that each area faced with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, it evaluates their potential and opportunity areas in a domestic and international context of increased geopolitical competition, an environmental crisis and the urgency of economic recovery.

Keywords: Trade Agreements, deep integration, European Union, Latin America.

About the authors

Ninfa M. Fuentes Sosa is Chair of the Division of International Studies at Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE-DEI).

Address: Mexico-Toluca Highway, 3655 - Col. Lomas de Santa Fé, Mexico City, Mexico | ninfa.fuentes@cide.edu

Luis A. Barrueta Ocampo is a business consultant at Exsequor Ventures | lb@exsequor-ventures.com



Acronyms and abbreviations

AD Anti-Dumping Measures

CACM Central American Common Market

CU Customs Union

DSM Dispute Settlement Mechanism

EFTA European Free Trade Association

EU European Union

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDP Gross Domestic Product

MERCOSUR Southern Common Market

MFN Most-Favoured-Nation

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement

NT National Treatment

NTMs Non-tariff measures

SPS Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (WTO)

WTO World Trade Organisation

1 Introduction

Deep trade integration has been a significant topic for politicians and scholars for over 25 years as a means to promote economic development and foster international cooperation. With the ongoing efforts of political leaders to pursue deep integration and international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) advocating for further integration to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, understanding the concept of deep integration and its implications is essential. The pandemic has caused disruptions to countries' economies, political and social spheres, and has weakened multilateral institutions while exacerbating tensions between major economic powers.

Trade agreements are critical instruments governing international trade; however, there is no consensus on what deep integration means in the context of trade agreements and how it can be assessed. Deep trade agreements generally contain provisions that regulate aspects beyond the removal of border barriers and aim to increase market access and deepen the economic integration of their members. Such provisions may include competition, government procurement, investment, labour, protection of intellectual property rights, or environmental issues. Mattoo et al. (2020: 3) found that the coverage of policy areas and provisions in trade agreements has increased since 2000. The trade agreements established between the European Union (EU) and Latin America (LA) are considered deep integration agreements due to the number and nature of the areas they cover.

This paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of deep trade integration by addressing two main questions. First, what is the structure and nature of deep integration in the agreements signed between Latin American countries and the European Union? Second, how has deep integration in these trade agreements contributed to addressing the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic?

The EU has pursued deep trade integration with Latin American and Caribbean countries since the 1990s, motivated by historical, cultural, and economic ties. This integration has developed within broader multidimensional agreements, encompassing cooperation, political dialogue, and trade. Although these pillars have developed unevenly within and between the agreements, this paper will focus on the trade component as it pertains to deep trade integration. We will delve into the specific provisions, their enforcement mechanisms, and the impacts of these agreements on the trade potential of the involved countries.

The relationship between the EU and Latin America has evolved alongside transformations in the international context (EPRS, 2019). Initially, the EU's strategy

aimed to gain market access to Latin America and the Caribbean region and balance the dominance of the US. This approach was intended to foster economic growth, regional integration, and political cooperation. As a region, Latin American and Caribbean countries currently constitute the EU's fifth trading partner. The integration strategy was disrupted in the 2000s by the arrival of several left-wing governments in LA interested in alternatives to the previous free-trade approach. These governments pursued regional integration strategies that differed from those advocated by the EU, leading to a diversification of trade patterns and relationships.

Today, the EU and LA relationship faces increasing challenges from the international context, such as geopolitical competition, protectionism, supply chain disruptions, environmental crises, and changes in global power equilibriums. These challenges have implications for the depth and scope of trade agreements, requiring more complex and comprehensive provisions to address contemporary issues. Additionally, the urgent need for economic recovery after the pandemic has further emphasised the importance of deep trade integration.

The EU has signed agreements or is under negotiations with regional schemes in LA, including Central America, MERCOSUR, the Andean Community, and CARIFORUM. It has also signed bilateral agreements with Chile and Mexico, both of which have been revised and modernised, with ratification and entry into force still pending. In this paper, we will examine each of these agreements. By doing so, we aim to provide a comprehensive understanding of deep trade integration in the context of EU-Latin America relations and its role in addressing the challenges brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The paper is structured as follows: First, we analyse the structure and nature of deep integration in the agreements signed between Latin American countries and the European Union. We examine the provisions in each agreement, their enforcement mechanisms, and how these features address emerging challenges and priorities. Second, we assess the impacts of deep integration in these trade agreements on the involved countries' ability to face the challenges prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for the future of EU-Latin America trade relations, deep trade integration, and the role of trade agreements in addressing global challenges. We will also offer policy recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of deep trade integration in promoting economic recovery, fostering international cooperation, and addressing the complex challenges facing both regions in a rapidly changing global context.

In sum, this paper provides an analysis of deep trade integration between the European Union and Latin America, examining its structure, nature, and impacts on addressing the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Through this analysis, we aim to contribute to a better understanding of deep trade integration and its implications for the future of international trade relations and global governance between both regions.

Analytical and methodological approach

This research investigates the reciprocal preferential trade agreements between the EU and LA regional schemes or individual countries, focusing on currently enforced agreements. This analysis includes agreements based on previous agreements and newly negotiated agreements. The EU-Latin America negotiations have undergone multiple stages over time, with some agreements in modernisation process. The study works with information from enforced agreements and discusses planned or ongoing negotiation or modernisation processes.

The study primarily utilises the information about the agreements signed between the EU and LA contained in the original hand-coded Database of Deep Integration in Latin America (Fuentes-Sosa, 2014) and its updated version (Fuentes-Sosa, 2022). The information is supplemented with information from partially overlapping databases. The wording of the coding templates (Annex I) was adjusted, where possible, to be similar to relevant and recent studies to facilitate the aggregation of knowledge. This database provides a relatively more detailed institutional and operative dimensions coding and it is, to the best of our knowledge, it is the most comprehensive for studying deep integration in Latin American countries' trade agreements. The databases' construction follows an original approach to studying deep integration in preferential trade agreements, as described below.

The research approach differentiates provisions contributing to deep integration by examining their function, scope, policy area coverage, and included measures. Assessing the depth of existing trade agreements is complex due to the various concepts and measures often used to study deep integration. Provisions promoting deep integration vary in three basic levels: institutional features, policy area coverage, and provisions/mechanisms for managing the agreement's operation at the policy area level. The detailed analytical rationale for classifying features into institutional, operative, and horizontal dimensions can be found in Fuentes-Sosa (2022). The institutional features cover mandate and scope, enforcement capabilities, requirements to enter into force and for amendment, and permanency. The operative mechanisms include, first, the administrative bodies and cooperation mechanisms that support the operation of the agreement; second, escape clauses and contingent measures, which can temporarily affect the operation of the agreement. Finally, the assessment of coverage includes the following policy areas: coverage of goods and services, trade facilitation, rules of origin, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, competition policy, and government procurement.

The categorisation is tested empirically through principal components analyses (Fuentes-Sosa, 2022). The findings indicate that the analytical classification matches the structure of deep integration uncovered by the principal components analysis, and deep integration cannot be adequately captured by a single dimension. There are differences in the underlying structure of the measures, provisions, and regulations in each dimension.

Institutional features, operative mechanisms, and coverage

This section analyses the dimensions of deep integration in the EU-LA agreements currently in force. The first part presents a schematic overview of the scores of deep integration achieved by each agreement overall and on each of the studied dimensions: institutional features, operative mechanisms and coverage. The second part addresses in more detail each dimension. First, the institutional dimension is analysed, including the mandate and scope of the agreements, the requirements to enter into force and amend the agreement, enforcement mechanisms, and permanency. Second, the operative dimension is studied, including the mechanisms to administer, manage and facilitate the correct implementation and operation of the agreements. Third, the section analyses the coverage of policy areas in the agreements, emphasising their contribution towards deep integration by removing trade barriers. The paper schematically assesses the strengths and areas of opportunity to deepen integration across its dimensions. Finally, the paper also explores the challenges and opportunities in each area to face the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Overview

This section provides an overview of deep integration in the agreements signed by the EU and LA, which are in force. As previously mentioned, at the time of writing, the region had several agreements in modernization processes that, upon implementation, may change aspects of their structure. Because this study requires the complete texts of the agreements, the study was conducted with the information of the agreement in force. The next section expands on the possible changes in the structure of the agreements and the status of the modification process.

The EU-LA trade agreements encompass a variety of partnerships and statuses (Table 1). The Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement with Mercosur has yet to be ratified, while a finalised bi-regional free trade agreement is expected by mid-2023. Mexico's modernised Global Agreement is pending ratification due to concerns over legal changes proposed by Brussels. The EU-Chile Association Agreement is set to be modernised, with the trade component anticipated to be signed and entered into force in 2024. The EU and Central American countries' Association Agreement has been effective since 2013. The EU's trade agreement with the Andean Community countries, including Ecuador's 2017 accession, continues to be in force. Finally, the PDCA with Cuba has been provisionally applied since 2017, awaiting Lithuania's ratification.

Table 1. Status of the main preferential trade agreements between EU-LA agreements (trade pillar) as of February 2023.

Trade Partner(s)	Agreements' status
Mercosur	The Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Mercosur was established in 1999 but is still pending ratification. A political agreement on the trade component of the Association Agreement was reached in 2019 and finalised in June 2020. In March 2023, the EU and Mercosur agreed on a work plan to finalise the bi-regional free trade agreement by the end of the year's first half. Negotiators discussed an EU-proposed document as the basis for additional Mercosur commitments in the environmental field. The finalised agreement is scheduled for translation in July 2023, with an anticipated signing during the second half of the year when Spain holds the rotating EU presidency.
Mexico	The Economic Partnership, Political Coordination, and Cooperation Agreement (Global Agreement) was signed in 1997 and came into force in 2000. Negotiations to modernise the Global Agreement began in 2016, culminating in an agreement in principle reached in April 2018. However, in January 2023, Mexico did not approve the trade deal, expressing concerns over legal changes recently proposed by Brussels. Consequently, the modernised agreement remains pending ratification.
Chile	The Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and Chile was signed in 1996. The EU-Chile Association Agreement was signed in 2002 and entered into force in 2003, including a comprehensive free trade and investment pact and a framework for political relations. Both partners agreed to modernise the agreement in 2016. The modernised trade agreement is expected to be signed in 2024 and enter into force in 2024. The full Association Agreement will enter into force at a later date.
Central America	In June 2007, the European Union (EU) and Central American countries—including Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama –agreed to negotiate an Association Agreement. Following several rounds of negotiations, the EU and Central American countries reached an agreement in principle in 2010, which led to the formal signing of the Association Agreement in 2012. The free trade agreement component of the Association Agreement came into effect in 2013. Subsequently, between 2014 and 2016, the Association Agreement was ratified by EU member states and Central American countries.
Andean Community (Peru, Colombia, Ecuador)	The negotiations for the trade agreement involving the European Union (EU), Colombia, and Peru were concluded in 2010. Subsequently, the agreement was signed by the EU, Colombia, and Peru in 2012, with provisional application commencing in Peru and Colombia in 2013. –A protocol of Accession to the Trade Agreement was signed in 2017 to accommodate Ecuador's accession.
Cuba	The Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) has been under provisional application since 2017. Lithuania is the only country that has not yet approved the PDCA, citing concerns that have prevented it from ratifying the agreement (European Parliament, 2021).

Sources: European Parliamentary Research Service (2019), Grieger (2020), European Commission (2022a, 2022b), Bounds et al (2023), Euronews (2023), European Parliament (2021), Moreira (2023).

The following analysis highlights general existing variations in the nature and levels of deep integration at the institutional, operative, and coverage dimensions of each agreement and between them. Table 2 presents the overall deep integration scores and each component's score in the trade agreements established between EU and Latin American regional schemes and countries. The scores in each dimension were rescaled


in a range (0,1) to give equal weight to each of them and facilitate their comparability. Without normalising the scores in each component, it cannot be assessed whether the agreements are more profound in the first and second components than in the third. Rescaling the scores allows more precise comparisons within the agreements and between them. In this new scale, one corresponds to the highest score that an agreement achieved. Figure1 below illustrates broadly said variations. The graph includes the agreement signed with CARIFORUM for reference.

Table 2. Scores of deep integration in the trade agreements between the EU and LA

Agreement	Institutional (re-scaled)	Operative (re-scaled)	Coverage (re-scaled)	Overall
EU - Mexico	0,55	0,29	0,49	1,34
EU - Chile	0,64	0,50	0,96	2,10
EU - CARIFORUM	0,88	0,77	0,84	2,48
EU - Central America	0,96	0,81	0,85	2,62
EU - Colombia, Peru	0,88	0,90	0,89	2,66

Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of the text of the trade agreements.

Figure 1. Deep integration in the trade agreements between the EU and LA



Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of the text of the trade agreements.

The overall measure of deep integration shows evident variations across agreements. The agreements signed between the EU and the Andean Countries (overall 2.66 units) and Central America (overall 2.62 units) show similar overall deep integration measures overall and in each component. These agreements have the largest overall scores for deep integration. A possible explanation is that, over time, increased competition and

accumulated knowledge from other trade agreements could have promoted trends towards more profound agreements at the three dimensions.

Considering the three components, the maximum possible score for a trade agreement would be three, and the minimum score would be zero. The highest score of three would correspond to the hypothetical case, where a trade agreement obtained the highest scores in each dimension relative to the ones obtained by the other agreements analysed. These agreements would have, relatively, the most profound integration by having built the most robust institutions, the most functional mechanisms to manage the operation of the agreement, and the most extensive coverage. This hypothetical case does not appear in the studied agreements.

Differentiating the contributions of each dimension to the agreements' overall scores of each agreement reveals further variations. Figure 1 shows the disparity between the proportions corresponding to each dimension. The agreement with the Andean Countries shows the most equilibrated weight of the institutional, operative and coverage dimensions. The institutional dimension score is the largest of the three dimensions in most agreements. Only in the agreements with Chile (0.64 units) and the Andean Countries (0.88 units) do the institutional features less than the coverage score, and only in the agreement with the Andean Countries the score is also lower than the one of the operative mechanisms. Regarding coverage, the agreement with Chile (0.96 units) has the broadest coverage of policy areas among the studied agreements. This dimension is larger than the operative (0.50 units) and institutional ones (0.64 units) in the agreement signed with Chile; larger than the operative one (0.81 units) in the agreements with Central America, CARIFORUM (0.77 units), Chile (0.50 units) and Mexico (0.29 units); and larger than the institutional one in the agreement with Chile. The agreement with Chile had the largest score regarding operative mechanisms (2.10 units). In general, the scores of the operative mechanisms are lower than those of coverage and institutional features in all agreements, except for the one signed with the Andean Countries (0.96 units).

Institutions

The EU established free trade agreements between regional schemes (EU-CACM and EU-Andean Countries) and between the EU and a third party (EU-Mexico and EU-Chile). The EU-LA agreements have clear institutional structures with well-specified attributes. The agreements establish a Joint Council as the leading institution responsible for decision-making and follow-up activities. Hierarchically, the authority of the Joint Council is below that of the heads of state. As described in the next section, these agreements also have mechanisms that make implementing their obligations easier. Bonilla and Sanahuja (2022: 261) describe the current state of the institutional architecture of these agreements as follows. In the EU-Mexico agreement, a Joint Council and Implementation Committee are in place, with ad hoc committees available

to resolve disputes and a joint parliamentary body that does not involve civil society in decision-making. The EU-Andean countries' Joint Committee oversees compliance and implementation, with technical issues handled in subcommittees responsible for specific matters. The authors mention that because of their prior institutional experience with other association instruments, the EU-Andean countries' agreement has a relatively more flexible structure that adapts to its changing needs.

As in most trade agreements, the ones signed by the EU-LA require domestic procedures to enter into force and may remain in operation until members withdraw. Most trade agreements mention amendment procedures that would require fulfilling domestic legal procedures. The first-generation agreements the EU signed with Chile and Mexico did not explicitly mention amendment procedures. In all agreements, except EU-Andean Countries, explicitly, no reservations were allowed at the time of signature. The EU-Andean Countries agreement, as approximately half of the agreements established by countries in LA, explicitly requires ratification. Bonilla and Sanahuja (2022-261) mention that the institutional structure in Central America has faced challenges in ratification due to its rigid architecture and suggests the need for more flexible mechanisms for dialogue and coordination.

The dispute settlement mechanisms (DSM) contribute the most to the institutional dimension when they are autonomous from governments, cover more policy areas, and have binding commitments. Dispute settlement is an area of interest for the EU to create a more stable environment for international trade. At the multilateral level, to face the stagnation of the WTO in this area, the EU led the establishment of a transitional Multiparty Interim Appeal Arbitration Agreement while strengthening the DSM of its preferential trade agreements (Caldentey del Pozo, 2022; 69). Regarding LA, it is also an important area, as over 90% of its agreements include dispute settlement provisions and establish guidelines about their use.

Accordingly, EU-LA agreements include dispute settlement mechanisms with binding decision-making capacities and provisions to guide their use. However, their enforceability may vary across policy areas, as they all include exceptions. Furthermore, governments may rely more on countervailing duties and other mechanisms to address specific issues. Some agreements have other restrictions, such as the first-generation EU-Mexico agreement, which did not include the possibility of a third party weighing on sanctions. Furthermore, the coverage of the DSM in negotiating the EU-MERCOSUR agreement has been a source of disagreement between the partners, particularly regarding environmental provisions.¹ Domestic actors in the EU demand relatively more direct linkages between market access and the satisfaction of environmental objectives (Caetano, 2022: 227).

1. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay signed the Multiparty Interim Appeal Arbitration Agreement established at the WTO (Caetano, 2022: 231).

The institutional dimension has the highest deep integration scores in the EU-LA agreements.² As with other LA agreements, political issues limit the effectiveness of their institutions. In contrast with the EU, LA governments have historically struggled with creating supranational institutions and have resisted delegating competencies and powers to their trade agreements. As a result, governments in the region are reticent to coordinate through supranational or intergovernmental institutions. Recently, the pandemic that hit the region in 2020 evidenced the agreements' institutions' severe shortcomings in their international trade responses. Ruano and Saltalamacchia (2021: 96) explain that the States' prevalence in Latin American regionalism has made these schemes dependent on shared interests between their members. They explain that the States' preeminence has also prevented these schemes from facing crises in a coordinated way.³ Therefore, governments in the region require incentives and political will to overcome their reluctance to use the EU-LA institutions to deepen their trade integration and coordinate responses to challenges such as the ones derived from the pandemic.

Operative mechanisms

Although most LA trade agreements are intergovernmental and lack supranational institutions, they include administrative bodies and mechanisms to manage their operation and obligations. This study separates the latter into two groups. First, organisational instruments that oversee, support and manage obligations and further cooperation in particular policy areas. Second, the trade defence instruments that temporarily stop some of the agreement's commitments and obligations when countries experience external conditions or unfair trade practices, causing harm to their producers. As in the institutional dimension, the pandemic exposed the limitations of the operative mechanisms and bodies to channel and promote coordination and collaboration to face its effects.

Administrative bodies and cooperation mechanisms

The EU-LA agreements facilitate the implementation of their obligations through technical committees, which may have decision-making powers at the highest level. All LA agreements include administrative bodies that help implement the agreement, but the specific policy areas they cover can vary. The EU-LA agreements include a central technical committee that monitors and resolves implementation problems. The agreements also establish specific subcommittees for their areas of interest. Most of these mechanisms concentrate on technical areas, including exchanging information, providing technical assistance, reviewing decisions, and making recommendations. For

2. In the LA agreements, the institutional dimension also has the highest deep integration scores, with slight variation between agreements with advanced economies and developing partners (Fuentes-Sosa, 2022).

3. The authors mention that the MERCOSUR stalled progress on its liberalisation when the 2000-2001 crisis hit Brazil and Argentina. In the same way, when Colombia and Venezuela conflicted in 2006, the Andean Community deteriorated. Furthermore, UNASUR broke down in 2018 with the crisis in Venezuela.

example, the EU-Chile establishes a Committee on Trade and a Coordination Meeting to address issues regarding its operation. In turn, the EU-Andean Countries address technical issues in subcommittees devised for specific matters.

Regarding variations in the coverage of policy areas, for example, all EU-LA agreements include regional bodies about TBT. Only the first-generation EU-Mexico agreement does not include a similar mechanism for SPS measures. This situation contrasts with most LA agreements that have regional bodies for TBT, but only a few have similar bodies for SPS measures.

Bonilla and Sanahuja (2022, 261-262) explain that these bodies tend to be more rigid in older agreements and more flexible in newer agreements. For example, the EU-Andean countries agreement maintains stable bodies and committees in areas such as tariffs, agriculture, intellectual property, trade and sustainability; while creating other bodies and groups, such as issues concerning SPS measures and rules of origin, as the needs have arisen.

As with the institutional dimension, the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the limitations of the operative mechanisms for coordination and collaboration. Despite the situation's urgency, the over-reliance on individual states inhibited broader collaboration and coordination efforts, which could have contributed to effectively addressing the crisis. According to Ruano and Saltalamacchia (2021), technical cooperation in the region has proven to be a relatively successful area for cooperation, even during political disagreements. The authors mention that in this area, several regional schemes could overcome political divisions and even paralysis, making technical collaboration a viable area for cooperation in LA, even during a political disagreement.⁴ A possible reason for the contrasting outcomes regarding less technical areas may be that structures and cooperation networks already in place are denser than those of less technical areas. Then, countries can more effectively address future challenges by using the operative capacities, platforms and networks already created in their trade agreements.

Management of temporary protection

Escape clauses, also known as trade remedies or contingent measures, have been considered valuable as they provide flexibility for governments to deal with the pressure of domestic groups that may be harmed by import surges or unfair trade practices from other countries. Regulations concerning countervailing measures tend to be more limited than antidumping duties because the former target governments' actions instead of those of private actors. Around 11% of the LA agreements state that solutions on antidumping duties must be mutually acceptable, while more than 70% have the same condition for countervailing duties. Regarding antidumping, 15% of

4. Regional groups, such as the CACM, could mobilise expertise and technical knowledge to respond effectively to the crisis. In contrast, others like MERCOSUR struggled to cooperate (Ruano & Saltalamacchia, 2021).

the agreements include a provision of a lesser duty rule. None of the agreements out ruled safeguards, but only half included specific provisions and a similar proportion established tariff ceilings. Finally, around 40% excluded the application of global safeguards to members.

None of the EU-LAC agreements disallow antidumping actions or the imposition of countervailing duties or out rule safeguards. However, regarding antidumping actions, only the EU-Andean countries agreement includes a lesser duty rule, and none of the agreements specify that solutions must be mutually acceptable. In the case of countervailing duties, only the first-generation EU-Mexico agreement does not include specific guidelines. Also, as in the other LA agreements, all out-ruled subsidies, but none prohibited other governmental support. Finally, regarding safeguards, only the EU-CA and EU-Andean countries include upper limits, and only the first-generation EU-Mexico agreement excludes the application of global safeguards to members.

The lack of more regulations and guidelines regarding the imposition of countervailing duties has already made the area controversial in the aftermath of the pandemic. Governments have implemented support measures and financial packages to revive their economies from the pandemic-induced crisis. This situation has led to a global increase in investigations into subsidies. Firms that receive government benefits to improve their export performance may be subject to countervailing measures. As a result, exporters, primarily small and medium enterprises, must weigh the risk of receiving COVID-related stimulus against facing anti-subsidy investigations in their export markets. The WTO's Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Committee had warned in April 2021 that the lack of notifications from WTO members about the subsidies they have provided to their firms could cause friction in future trade negotiations.

Coverage of policy areas

This subsection addresses the main policy areas in which partners eliminate trade barriers. First, it explores the broadest scope of preferential trade agreements, which generally include goods and services. Some agreements that include services, like the first-generation EU-Mexico, only do so in a limited way. Second, it evaluates each policy area based on three criteria: inclusion of the trade-related area in the agreement text, elimination of trade barriers, and reduction of transaction costs for trade. The policy areas examined include trade facilitation, rules of origin, services, TBT, SPS measures, competition, and government procurement. The provisions and regulations in these areas are designed to facilitate trade between members by instructing specific obligations, promoting convergence, reducing unnecessary procedures, and increasing transparency. Finally, the subsections highlight the challenges and opportunities posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in each policy area.

As of this writing, several agreements between Latin American (LA) countries and the EU and EFTA have either undergone recent modernisation or are still being updated. The EU's agreements with Chile and Mexico incorporated elements of political dialogue, economic collaboration, and cooperation. Regarding the free trade agreement, modernisation involved updating its content in several areas or adding new ones. For example, the EU-Mexico revised aspects such as competition, market access, transparency, state enterprises, SPS measures, regulatory practices, sustainable development, and investment. The revised agreement includes cooperation to enhance political dialogue and technical and scientific collaboration. In 2020, the partners concluded negotiations on the last outstanding element, the technical aspects of government procurement. The modernised agreement is yet to come into force as it is undergoing the necessary domestic legal procedures.

Services

Services have become increasingly important in international trade as standalone services and components that add value to products or other services. Despite the continuous growth of trade in services, accounting for about half of the international trade, the WTO has found that the costs of trading services are roughly twice as high as those for goods. The difference is due to unwarranted regulation disparities, cumbersome and unclear processes, and opacity. As a result, organisations such as the WTO and ECLAC have called for convergence among trade partners in their regulations and procedures for services to deepen integration and reinvigorate international trade.

In general, LA agreements cover services more comprehensively than other policy areas. Over 90% of the agreements studied reference the GATS or other relevant arrangements, while around 70% have chapters specifying conditions for covered service sectors (Fuentes-Sosa, 2022). Accordingly, all EU-LA agreements reference the GATS or other relevant schemes and have chapters specifically addressing services. Approximately 80% of EU-LA agreements include provisions for most-favoured-nation treatment. In contrast, from the EU-LA agreements, only the EU-Mexico agreement includes it. Most LA agreements include national treatment for services; from the EU-LA agreements, only the EU-CA does not include it.

The pandemic has affected the trade of services differently depending on the mode of delivery. Despite the challenges, the crisis accelerated some positive changes in the trade of services. Services provided remotely or digitally have prospered, while tourism and other services that require travel have been severely impacted. The pandemic also exposed inefficiencies and the need for convergence in regulations and procedures between trade partners. Political tensions also made it challenging to coordinate the responses to the crisis.

Convergence towards deep integration in services would aid in reducing the discrepancies in regulations and procedures between trade partners, increasing transparency, consistency, and certainty. Countries should also continue working on regulating taxes on digital services and agreeing on equitable rules for e-commerce.

Although services in EU-LA agreements are relatively more developed than in other LA agreements, new challenges such as digitalisation, e-commerce, and mobility of people require more resources, cooperation, coordination, and political will than what is currently in place.

Trade facilitation and rules of origin

Improvements in rules of origin and trade facilitation benefit all participants by reducing transaction costs and increasing efficiency in trade processes. First, the increasing number of preferential trade agreements between countries has resulted in the superposition of different rules of origin, often represented as a spaghetti bowl. These rules have become numerous and complex, increasing trade costs and negatively affecting trade relations. Countries may reduce these barriers to trade by broadening the scope of the cumulation of rules of origin in preferential agreements.

ECLAC (2020) suggests that LA agreements should work towards full cumulation for improving convergence and using a single set of rules of origin to support regional economies of scale, increase productivity, and promote economic development. More flexible rules of origin could also stimulate open regionalism instead of divisions into trade blocks. Over 90% of the LA agreements, including those signed with the EU, contain *de minimis* provisions and allow bilateral and partial cumulation. Nevertheless, less than 10% of the LA agreements allow full or diagonal cumulation and only about 20% allow cross-cumulation (Fuentes-Sosa, 2022). None of the agreements signed with the EU allow these types of cumulation. Hence, a single set of rules of origin for the region is still far from reality, and countries would require a long road to building such a scenario.

Despite including general principles about trade facilitation and addressing rules of origin, many LA agreements need more specific mechanisms to work efficiently towards this end. Advanced rulings are a notable exception, with about 70% of agreements of LA agreements including this procedure. In contrast, the agreements lack provisions such as freedom of transit of goods, single window, and guidelines for immediate release. Regarding plurilateral agreements, only the EU-Andean countries incorporate a single window. Furthermore, there is no harmonisation in trade facilitation procedures across any of the agreements.

Rules of origin and trade facilitation have improved in the modernised and more recent EU-LA agreements. The EU-CA agreement includes relatively advanced trade facilitation provisions (Caldentey del Pozo, 2022: 56). The EU-Mexico modernised

agreement increases the transparency of the rules of origin (Grieger, 2020, p. 11) and enhances trade facilitation by improving customs procedures benefiting European industries, such as the pharmaceutical and machinery and transport equipment (Serrano Caballero, 2022: 154-155). The negotiations with MERCOSUR have included relatively more flexible rules of origin, although variations depend on the sector. For example, MERCOSUR maintained drawbacks of importing productive inputs and set regional content requirements at intermediate levels for some sensitive sectors. In turn, the machinery and auto parts sectors were closer to the European position, requiring less cumulation (Caetano, 2022: 218).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the disorderly response from governments made it challenging to manage disruptions in international trade flows, highlighting the importance of trade facilitation. Measures for improving this area include streamlining cross-border procedures, establishing inter-operable single windows, and integrating different digital trade logistics systems. ECLAC (2020) warns that developing and implementing these measures in LA would require the complex redesign of trade logistics procedures. Countries must also identify areas of opportunity where said measures can be successfully implemented. By reducing trade barriers in logistics, the EU-LA agreements could promote bi-regional convergence and foster integration into global value chains. Convergence in this area would facilitate trade partners to avoid disorganised responses in future crises.

SPS measures and technical regulations

SPS and TBT measures are essential for protecting health in general. SPS measures aim to eliminate disease and pest risks to protect human, animal, or plant health. TBT are standards, assessments and procedures necessary for health and safety protection. The regulation of these measures contributes to deep trade integration when it restricts their protectionist utilisation. For example, establishing mutual recognition arrangements and common, or harmonised, standards and conformity assessment processes based on scientific evidence.

The LA agreements cover more fully TBT than SPS measures, with common or mutually recognised regulations being more prevalent in the latter. The EU-LA agreements include chapters or provisions on SPS and TBT. However, there are differences between both areas. For example, the Chile-EU agreement was relatively more advanced in technical standards and SPS measures. In contrast, the first-generation EU-Mexico agreement did not go beyond what was agreed upon at the WTO regarding TBT (Hernández, 2022: 267). Also, the EU-LA agreements, except the first-generation EU-Mexico, refer to the WTO regarding SPS; all do it regarding TBT. Around 43% of the LA agreements refer to international standards. From those established with the EU, only the EU-CA includes standards for SPS and the one with Chile for TBT. Furthermore, less than 3% of the LA

agreements mutually recognise standards or audits. None of the EU-LA agreements includes them. Finally, only the EU–Chile and EU-Andean countries mention that risk assessments of SPS measures must be based on scientific evidence.

The modernised and second-generation EU-LA agreements have improved the regulation of TBT and SPS measures. The EU-Mexico and EU-Chile agreements improve transparency and cooperation in SPS measures. The EU-Andean countries agreement has a mechanism, the Subcommittee on Trade and Sustainable Development, which manages TBT and SPS measures and has continued improving the regulation of SPS measures (Hernández, 2022: 267).

The region must work towards establishing mutual recognition arrangements and promoting the use of international or regional standards based on scientific evidence. This approach would reduce the gaps in TBT and SPS measures and contribute to the countries' integration into global value chains while increasing their resilience to future crises.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, many countries used SPS measures and technical regulations to prevent the spread of the virus. By December 2020, according to the WTO (2020), 106 measures in technical regulations and 65 measures related to SPS measures were notified by 38 WTO members. While some countries initially enacted measures that disrupted trade, most subsequently implemented actions facilitated it. Most TBT measures were temporary (approximately six months) and covered personal protection equipment. Regarding SPS measures, half were notified of emergency measures; about two-thirds were temporary measures with commercial partners (Grieger, 2020, p. 11, Hernández, 2022: 154). From the regular notifications, more than 90% were measures intended to reduce trade barriers.

Most SPS measures decreased trade barriers by allowing electronic certificates, primarily for plant products. Actions concerning TBT facilitated conformity assessments to increase the supply of medical and other essential products. The current LA agreements, in general, and those with the EU lack provisions for harmonisation, mutual recognition (of standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessment processes), or common standards. This situation created obstacles to responding coordinately to the challenges posed by the pandemic.

Besides the complexity of restructuring processes leading to convergence in TBT and SPS measures, another challenge is that the countries' disparities in access to technical capacities may further hinder convergence in this area. Therefore, governments would require political, financial, and technical capacities to create a feasible basis for more ambitious integration projects.

Competition and Government procurement

Deep trade agreements include measures to regulate competition and government procurement to limit activities that may impair the operations of markets. These provisions have a public goods nature as they benefit members of the agreements and non-members by tackling anti-competitive practices and promoting competition.

However, the lack of substantive provisions that regulate discriminatory competition practices is a challenge to achieving deep integration. In the LA agreements 70% include a competition chapter, but less than 7% have regional binding instruments, and only around 15% regulate cartels and mergers and acquisitions. The first-generation EU-Mexico agreement did not include a competition chapter. Several EU-LA agreements refer to other treaties and instruments to complement competition regulation. For example, the EU-Chile and the EU-Andean countries' agreements acknowledge that GATT and WTO instruments may complement the agreement in this area. The EU-Andean countries agreement also mentions binding regional competition instruments. All EU-LA agreements prohibit or regulate cartels, concerted practices, and abuse of market dominance.

Government procurement is relatively less advanced than competition, in general. About 23% of the LA agreements referred to the WTO agreement on government procurement, but only about 30% covered all government entities; 18% covered only central and sub-central government and 13% only central government units (Fuentes-Sosa, 2022). All EU-LA agreements cover central-level governments and sub-central governments (the first-generation agreement EU-Mexico did not cover fully sub-national entities).

Regarding non-discrimination, all EU-LA agreements contain explicit provisions on national treatment, but none included explicit provisions about MFN treatment. Concerning procedures, EU-Chile and EU-CA, included provisions on the qualification of suppliers and all EU-LA agreements (except first-generation EU-Mexico) about technical specifications, limited tendering, and award of contracts. Although all EU-LA agreements prohibit the anti-competitive behaviour of SOE (State Owned Enterprises) monopolies, only EU-Chile regulates state aid.

The negotiation of public procurement has been relatively complex. For example, both parties of the modernised EU-Mexico agreement extended the coverage of public procurement regulations. Mexico opened its public procurement market at the sub-federal level for the first time. However, the last issue to close the negotiation of the modernisation of the EU-Mexico agreement on 28 April 2020 was sub-state public procurement (Serrano Caballero, 2022: 152).

Negotiating the government procurement chapter has also proved difficult in the EU-MERCOSUR agreement. The agreement would be the first to open MERCOSUR's public procurement market to a large partner. The agreement would only cover

partially sub-national entities and provides a phasing out of 15 years for MERCOSUR (Caetano, 2022: 221). MERCOSUR's non-compliance with its internal agreements on government purchases is viewed with suspicion. This situation could improve if the internal rules converge with those negotiated with the EU (Caetano, 2022: 231). Additionally, government procurement should extend concessions made to developed partners towards other countries in LA.

The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the necessity and urgency of addressing the lack of coordination and collaboration in competition and government procurement. The trend toward law enforcement of international competition had already been developing before the pandemic. Bustillo (2021: 22) warns that the pandemic has increased the digitalisation of trade processes, while governments have increased the monitorisation of market performance. This situation makes strengthening legislative and regulatory frameworks essential to prevent anti-competitive practices and promote competition.

In government procurement, the OECD and other organisations have recommended that countries increase their negotiating leverage by working collaboratively through their regional schemes when purchasing essential and medical goods. However, instead of collaboration, several countries implemented additional regulations or guides to manage and allocate their emergency procurement activities.

Also, ECLAC (2020) recommends adopting detailed substantive provisions in government procurement and competition and maintaining digitalisation trends in these areas. Nevertheless, the disparities in countries' technical capacities may hinder progress toward convergence. Governments would require political and technical capacities to create convergence, as the current agreements provide only a limited basis for more ambitious regional projects.

Conclusions

This paper analysed reciprocal trade agreements between the European Union and Latin American regional schemes or single countries, focusing on the institutional, operative, and policy area dimensions. The study uncovered various strengths, areas of opportunity, and challenges faced by these agreements, particularly in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The governments' responses to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic underscored the importance of effective institutions in trade agreements. The crisis has exposed the need for adaptive decision-making processes, robust dispute settlement mechanisms, and well-coordinated responses. Future opportunities lie in strengthening the institutional frameworks of these agreements, including enhancing transparency, expediting decision-making, and fostering greater cooperation between the EU and LA countries.

In the same order, the pandemic put a strain on operative mechanisms, highlighting the limitations of administrative bodies and cooperation mechanisms in coordinating responses to crises. Future opportunities for deepening trade integration include improving the functioning of administrative bodies, promoting better communication and coordination between parties, and establishing more agile cooperation mechanisms capable of handling unforeseen events.

Also, the pandemic emphasised the significance of addressing key policy areas in trade agreements, such as trade facilitation, rules of origin, services, TBT, SPS measures, competition, and government procurement.

First, enhancing trade facilitation by simplifying and harmonising customs procedures, streamlining and standardising rules of origin procedures, promoting the use of digital technologies, and investing in infrastructure improvements can reduce transaction costs, foster greater transparency and contribute to the resilience of supply chains between the EU and LA countries.

Second, regarding TBT and SPS regulations, pursuing mutual recognition agreements, harmonised standards based on scientific evidence, and capacity-building initiatives can facilitate trade and ensure the safety and quality of products. The pandemic exposed the how critical these regulations became in facilitating international trade during the emergency.

Third, by the same logic, encouraging collaboration and establishing common guidelines on competition and government procurement could improve market access opportunities.

Finally, expanding the scope and depth of commitments in the services sector can create new opportunities for businesses and enhance competitiveness.

More importantly, improving the provision of virtual and remote services may close digital gaps between countries in both regions and become an asset in facing future emergencies.

A significant challenge in deepening trade integration between both regions lies in the disparities in countries' technical capacities and access to resources. These disparities are an obstacle to progress toward convergence in key policy areas. Future opportunities involve promoting capacity-building initiatives, knowledge sharing, and technical assistance to address these disparities and create a feasible basis for more ambitious integration projects.

Accordingly, achieving deep trade integration and improving resilience to future crises will require continued cooperation, coordination, and political will among EU and LA countries. Strengthening diplomatic ties, engaging in regular dialogue, and fostering trust among trading partners can facilitate progress in addressing the challenges and opportunities in the key policy areas mentioned above. Further research could build on this study by examining the implications of the potential changes in the structure of the agreements as they undergo modernisation processes.

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Annex I: Templates to code and measure deep trade integration

Table A.1 Measurement of the institutional dimension

Mandate and scope
What is the mandate and scope of the trade agreement?
(Free Trade Agreements) Institutions cover “substantially all the trade” (Yes=1; No=0)
(Custom Union) Institutions establish a common external tariff (Yes=1; No=0)
(Common Market) Institutions mandate to coordinate economic policy (Yes=1; No=0)
Enforcement
Does the agreement refer to established bilateral, regional, or multilateral enforcement mechanisms?
Reference to other agreements/institutions (Yes=1; No=0)
Does the agreement include review and appeal mechanisms/institutions?
Review and appeal mechanism exist (Yes=1, Partial coverage= 0.5, No=0)
Are resolutions of the dispute settlement mechanism binding?
Resolutions are explicitly binding (Yes=1; No=0)
Is the amount of compensation autonomously determined?
Compensation is determined (Formal arbiters =1; Both parties= 0.5; Complainant party=0)
Entry into force
After signing the agreement, are there domestic legal procedures before the agreement can enter into force? Are reservations allowed after signing the agreement?
Domestic/ internal requirements (Yes=1; No=0)
Ratification by the legislature is explicitly required (Yes=1; No=0)
Amendment
Is there a process in place to amend the agreement?
Amendment process in the text (Yes=1; No=0)
Does the process of amendment require domestic legal approval?
Domestic legal requirements (No= 0; Administrative commission= 0.5; Domestic legal requirements/ratification= 1)
Permanency
Does the agreement require renewal?
Renewal (After certain years=0; Automatic unless one party opts out after a specific years= 0.5; Agreement continues in force until one party withdraws =1)

Source: *Deep integration in the Trade Agreements of Latin American Countries* (Fuentes-Sosa, 2022).

Table A.2 Measurement of the operative dimension

Antidumping
Does the agreement refer to established bilateral, regional, or multilateral agreements? Reference to GATT/WTO or other agreement (Yes=1; No=0)
Does the agreement allow the use of antidumping measures? Antidumping (Disallowed=1; Allowed specific provisions =0.5; Not mentioned or no specific provisions=0)
Does the agreement regulate the use of antidumping measures? Mutual acceptable solution (Yes=1; No=0) Lesser duty rule (Yes=1; No=0)
Countervailing Duties
Does the agreement refer to established bilateral, regional, or multilateral agreements? Reference to GATT/WTO or other agreement (Yes=1; No=0)
Does the agreement allow the use of countervailing duties? Countervailing duties (Disallowed=1; Allowed specific provisions =0.5; Not mentioned or no specific provisions=0)
Does the agreement regulate the use of subsidies and state aid? Outrule subsidies (Yes=1; No=0) Outrule state aid that distorts trade (Yes=1; No=0)
Does the agreement regulate the use of countervailing duties? Mutual acceptable solution (Yes=1; No=0)
Safeguards
Does the agreement refer to established bilateral, regional, or multilateral agreements? Reference to GATT/WTO or other agreement (Yes=1; No=0)
Does the agreement allow the use of safeguards? Safeguards (Disallowed=1; Allowed specific provisions =0.5; Not mentioned or no specific provisions=0)
Does the agreement regulate the application of safeguards? Members are excluded, under specific conditions, from global action under WTO (Yes=1; No=0) Explicit temporary or quantitative limits to the use of safeguards (Yes=1; No=0)
Administrative bodies
Does the agreement set authorities or regional bodies with formal powers in the following areas (each area measured separately): rules of origin, trade facilitation, services, technical barriers, phytosanitary measures, antidumping measures, countervailing duties, safeguards, competition, government procurement, subsidies, and state enterprises? Formal authority exists (Yes=1; No=0)
Cooperation mechanisms
Does the agreement set regional bodies, committees, or other mechanisms to support the liberalization and integration in the areas mentioned above (each area measured separately)? Cooperation (Yes=1; No=0) Coordination (Yes=1; No=0) Exchange of information (Yes=1; No=0) Recommendations (Yes=1; No=0) Review (Yes=1; No=0) Technical assistance (Yes=1; No=0)

Source: *Deep integration in the Trade Agreements of Latin American Countries* (Fuentes-Sosa, 2022).

Table A.3 Measurement of the horizontal dimension

Coverage
What is the scope of coverage of the trade agreement?
Goods (Yes=1; No=0)
Services (Yes=1; No=0)
Trade Facilitation
Does the agreement include substantive provisions or chapters about trade facilitation?
Trade facilitation provisions/chapters (Yes= 1; No= 0)
Does the agreement refer to established bilateral, regional, or multilateral agreements?
Reference to TFA or the WTO (Yes=1; No=0)
Does the agreement stipulate substantive provisions in trade facilitation?
Freedom of transit for goods (Yes=1; No=0)
Does the agreement set provisions that simplify procedures for trade facilitation?
Single window (Interoperability =1; Single window: 0.5; No=0)
Harmonization of custom unions' legal arrangements (Yes=1; No=0)
Certification in free trade agreements (Interested party certification=1; Combined certification=0.5; Third party certification=0)
Mutual recognition of Authorized Economic Operations Systems (Yes=1; No=0)
Advanced rulings (Yes=1; No=0)
Rules of origin
Does the agreement include de minimis and absorption rules?
De minimis rule (Yes=1; No=0)
Absorption rule (Yes=1; No=0)
Does the agreement provide flexible procedures to fulfill product-specific requirements?
Cumulation (Cross/Full=1; Diagonal=0.5; Bilateral= 0)
Origin criteria can be determined cumulatively or alternatively (Yes=1; No=0)
Services
Does the agreement refer to established bilateral, regional, or multilateral agreements?
Reference to GATS, the WTO, or other agreement (Yes=1; No=0)
Does the agreement include trade disciplines requirements in services?
National treatment (Yes=1; Partially=0.5; No=0)
Most Favored Nation (Yes=1; No=0)
Does the agreement include substantive market access provisions in specific services?
Sector-specific chapters (Yes= 1; Limitations=0.5; No= 0)
Technical barriers to trade
Does the agreement refer to established bilateral, regional, or multilateral agreements?
Reference to the TBT Agreement, the WTO, or other agreement (Yes=1; No=0)
Does the agreement regulate technical trade barriers?
Chapter or provisions (Yes=1; No=0)
Is mutual recognition scheduled or in force?
Conformity assessment (Yes= 1; Scheduled: 0.5; No=0)
Technical regulations (Yes= 1; Scheduled: 0.5; No=0)
Standards (Yes= 1; Scheduled: 0.5; No=0)
Does the agreement support the use of regional or international standards?

Conformity assessment (Yes=1; No=0)
Technical regulations (Yes=1; No=0)
Standards (Yes=1; No=0)

Sanitary and phytosanitary measures

Does the agreement refer to established bilateral, regional, or multilateral agreements?

Reference to the SPS Agreement, the WTO, or other agreement (Yes=1; No=0)

Does the agreement regulate sanitary and phytosanitary measures?

Chapter (Yes=1; No=0)

Does the agreement require that sanitary and phytosanitary measures be based on objective, documented, and scientific evidence?

Evidence based measures (Yes=1; No=0)

Is mutual recognition or equivalence stated in the agreement?

Standards (Yes= 1; No=0)

Control inspections (Yes= 1; No=0)

Does the agreement support the use of regional or international standards?

Control inspections (Yes=1; No=0)

Risk assessments (Yes=1; No=0)

Standards (Yes=1; No=0)

Competition

Does the agreement refer to established bilateral, regional, or multilateral agreements?

Reference to GATT/WTO or other agreement (Yes=1; No=0)

Does the agreement include substantive provisions to regulate anti-competitive practices?

Concerted practices, unfair business practices (Yes=1; No=0)

Abuse of market dominance (Yes=1; No=0)

Mergers and acquisitions (Yes=1; No=0)

Monopolies (Yes=1; No=0)

Undertakings with special or exclusive rights/state enterprises (Yes=1; No=0)

State aid/subsidies (Yes=1; No=0)

Government procurement

Does the agreement refer to established bilateral, regional, or multilateral agreements?

Reference to GATT/WTO or other agreement (Yes=1; No=0)

What is the coverage of public procurement provisions?

Goods (Yes=1; Exceptions=0.5; No=0)

Services (Yes=1; Exceptions=0.5; No=0)

Do the provisions cover government entities and utilities?

Central government (Yes=1; No=0)

Regional government (Yes=1; No=0)

Government enterprises (Yes=1; No=0)

Does the agreement include trade disciplines requirements in government procurement?

National treatment (Yes=1; Partially=0.5; No=0)

Most Favored Nation (Yes=1; No=0)

Does the agreement include substantive provisions in government procurement?

Information on qualification of suppliers (Yes=1; No=0)

Information on intended procurements includes technical specifications (Yes=1; No=0)

Limited tendering is regulated (Yes=1; No=0)

Treatment of tenders and awarding of contracts is clearly stated (Yes=1; No=0)

About the Project

The Jean Monnet Atlantic Network 2.0 is a small network of six members that keep intense communication and joint activities on the Atlantic Basin. The Network also serves as a central arena for discussing globalisation and key major trends in the several Atlantic microcosms. By combining the national with the regional perspective, its research and debates take into account the different foreign interests and pressures, as well as a critical view on the possible roles and future of the European Union (EU) in the area.

It is the present link of a long chain of projects. In 2016, the project that established the first Jean Monnet Network on Atlantic Studies (jeanmonnetnetwork.com.br) sought to foster knowledge and co-operation among scholars and researchers on topics of fundamental importance for Atlantic actors in general, and for the EU, in particular. It involved a greater number of centres and universities.

Seven years later, still focussed on the original three broad thematic axes -Energy/Sustainability, Trade/Economy (International Economic Flows) and Security/Inequality-, the Jean Monnet Atlantic Network 2.0 represents a continuation and a rupture with the previous undertakings.

It intends to offer a wide, innovative and sometimes controversial view on Atlantic problems and the expectations on and scope of the EU activities relative to them. The papers in this series are a sample of its achievements.





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